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Settling the Trade to Africa 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, in 1698, the English Parliament passed An Act to Settle the 
Trade to Africa. When coming into effect a year later, it was to allow hundreds of merchants legal 
access to engage in trade to and from West Africa. Only a decade previously, traders whom had 
attempted to engage in such commercial activity outside the confines of the Royal African Company 
(the RAC) were subject to draconian legal action which effectively branded them as pirates.1 It was 
FRPPRQSUDFWLFHLQWKHVIRUWKH5$&WR³KDYHE\YHUWXHRIKLV0DM¶WLHV&KDUWHUD&RPPLVVLRQ
WR6HL]H,QWHUORSHUV´WKHLUFDUJRHVDQGWKHLUYHVVHOVZKHQFDXJKWHQJDJLQJLQan illicit trade Anglo-
African trade.2 Frequently referenced by historians as the beginning of an open trade, with merchants 
flooding to the West African coast, 1698 was the catalyst for the beginning of a huge increase in the 
numbers of enslaved Africans shipped across the Atlantic over the eighteenth century. 3  With 
FRPPHUFLDOFRPSHWLWLRQWRWKHVHµVHSDUDWHWUDGHUV¶XQPDWFKHGE\DQ\FKDUWHUHGPRQRSRO\FRPSDQ\
historians have also marked this as the endpoint for not just the RAC but all European chartered 
companies trading to Africa.4 Yet it is the seemingly inseparable nature of these two entities ± the 
Atlantic slave trade and the Royal African Company ± that has hindered historians from looking at the 
bigger picture surrounding 1698. Dominated by the loud, boisterous pamphlets which circulated 
London, the nation as a whole and the Atlantic colonies in the 1690s and early 1700s, historians even 
recently have been too quick to label the intended ideological opposition between separate traders and 
monopolists from contemporary literature. Written by the likes of Charles Davenant and Daniel Defoe 
as well as dozens of anonymous pamphleteers, these works on the state of Anglo-African trade were 
not representative of the commercial interactions that existed between separate traders and the RAC. 
Their rhetorical strengths in portraying the African trading debates as two mutually exclusive 
LGHRORJLHVZKLFKFRXOGQHYHUFROODERUDWHRUSDUWQHUKDVEHFRPHWKHKLVWRULDQ¶VZHDNQHVVLQSRUWUD\LQJ
the Anglo-African trade similarly. In reality, the 1698 Act initiated collaboration between Company 
and free trader that historians have heretofore failed to understand. Examining the Anglo-African 
                                                          
1
 6HHµ7KH&DVH RI5LFKDUGDQG0DUJDUHW1RYHPEHU¶LQ(OL]DEHWK'RQQDQDocuments Illustrative of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade to America, Volume I: 1441-1700 (Washington, 1930) pp.333-5. 
2
 µ,QVWUXFWLRQVWR&DSWDLQ6DPXHO.HPSWKRUQH/RQGRQWKHth 0D\¶LQ'RQQDQDocuments p.354. 
3
 Eric Williams; Capitalism and Slavery (London, 1944) p.32. 
4
 Hugh Thomas; The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1440-1870 (New York, 1997) p.225. 
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trade as much more than just the trade in enslaved Africans, this work looks at these aspects of 
cooperation, and encompasses the globalised nature of the trade to West Africa, focussing too on the 
deep commercial links that existed between English regional economies and West African markets by 
the turn of the eighteenth century. $VZHOODVWKLVZLWKDIRFXVRQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VFRORQLDOIRRWKROGRQ
the West African coast, the imperial ideology of successive English and British governments 
regarding the West African coast is addressed. 
In doing so, this work looks primarily at two large datasets, T 70/1198 and T 70/1199; 
information recorded by the RAC itself, which was to keep track of the Incomings and Outgoings (as 
the books are eponymously entitled) from the port of London trading to and from West Africa. The 
Incomings document charts the imported cargoes and vessels from West Africa, with the included 
commodities as well as the cargo owners and dates of voyage. The Outgoings does much the same, 
but for the exports and re-exports to West Africa. Following an insight into the 1698 Act itself, a 
methodological introduction and data description highlighting the essential aspects of what the 
&RPSDQ\¶VIncomings and Outgoings are able to show, will allow for clarity on how these arguments 
are to be addressed. These documents allow for a deeper, more detailed analysis of not only what was 
being traded to West Africa in the early eighteenth century ± building on the works by the likes of 
0DULRQ-RKQVRQ¶VAnglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century (1990) - but those whom owned the 
cargoes and their collaborators, as well as the non-commercial goods that were involved in 
maintaining the many settlements of the Royal African Company along the West African coast.  
Chapter II provides insight into the volume of goods distributed to West Africa, the 
Outgoings illustrating a huge growth in the number of global goods which were common amongst 
PHUFKDQWV¶FDUJRHV7KHOLNHVRI(DVW,QGLDQWH[WLOHVEHDGVZRRGVDQGOX[XU\IRRGVWXIIV$PHULFDQ
tobacco, furs and silver, European horticultural goods, cloth and linens, bullion, aliment and 
provisions, as well as a wide range of essential and luxury goods from across the British Isles were all 
extensively present, often in a single voyage. This aids in postulating an argument that the West 
African coast was one of the foremost globalised marketplaces at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
Observing the nature of the cargoes contained in the vessels travelling to West Africa, it becomes 
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clear that by 1708, most voyages contain goods with wide-reaching global origins, from China, the 
East Indies, Persia or regions of North and South America. Analysing the Company Outgoings, it is 
clear too that the Anglo-African trade was one in which commodities from all of these places were 
shipped together, by the same merchants on the same voyages in the first years of the eighteenth 
century. Traditionally, it has been the mid-eighteenth century that has taken focus regarding the 
emergence of globalised trade. The likes of Ralph Davis and Natasha Glaisyer have emphasised the 
importance of the 1740s-1760s as when Asian, American and European sourced goods were 
commonly incorporated on commercial voyages; when a British global trade was truly first 
witnessed.5 When combining the data of the Outgoings with contemporary political activity however, 
a clearer idea of the political economy of globalised commerce at the turn of the eighteenth century 
begins to emerge.  Acts which catalysed the re-exportation of foreign goods and penalised and 
forbade the importation of certain Indian textiles - most notably the Calico Act of 1700 ± were 
essential ingredients to this early globalised trade.6 The significance of the Outgoings in revealing the 
aspects of the globalised marketplace of West Africa lies most distinctly within the huge range of 
commodities listed. Furthering the work of Marion Johnson and others, the Outgoings chart over 450 
separate commodities shipped to Africa, 1702-1712, not simply focus on the most prominent amongst 
them. Assessment of the Outgoings also provides revision on some of the heavily referenced data 
from the likes of K G Davies, the foremost historian of the RAC in the twentieth century, to highlight 
WKDW WKH &RPSDQ\¶V FRPPHUFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO VWUHQJWKV ZLWQHVVHG IRU D VKRUW WLPH D JURZWK LQ
Company trading post-1698. This has long been overlooked in historiography. Crucially, noting the 
ownership of cargoes too, these documents allow for a far wider picture of the effect of the1698 Act 
to Settle the Trade to Africa, with implications not only for the RAC, but its relationship with separate 
traders, as well as the intrinsic economic links between England and West Africa as early as 1700.  
Chapter III looks at the communities within Britain whose manufacturing and productions 
were dependant on West African market demands. This becomes increasingly telling through the 
                                                          
5
 See Ralph Davis; µEnglish Foreign Trade, 1700-1774¶, The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1962), 
pp.285-303, DQG1DWDVKD*ODLV\HUµ([FKDQJHLQWKH(LJKWHHQWK&HQWXU\%ULWLVK(PSLUH¶LQThe Historical Journal, 47, 2 
(2004) pp.451-476. 
6
 Eacott, Jonathan; Selling Empire: India and the Making of Britain and America, 1600-1830 (North Carolina, 2016) p.89 
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cross referencing of the Outgoings with other such Company records of the day. The Outgoings 
highlight the significance West African markets held for English textile communities, and using a 
corroboration of other evidence it is possible to forge the political impact of these communities on the 
African trade debates in Britain. Where previous scholarly work with the likes of Joseph Inikori has 
established African influences on British manufacturing began in the 1760s, these documents insist 
that this was another process ongoing by the formative years of the eighteenth century. With this, it 
becomes possible to illustrate a view of the political ideology of successive English and British 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶WRZDUGV:HVWAfrica from the Restoration monarchs to the Parliamentary governments 
of the early eighteenth century. The 1698 Act was fundamentally about the security of the English 
colonial presence in West Africa, comparable to that of the Caribbean and East Indies, in spite of the 
very real weaknesses that been suffered and sustained during the War of the League of Augsburg.7 
While they may have been inadequate in the supply of enslaved Africans, for decades they were 
considered by English governing powers to be the bastion of state control in West Africa.8 The 
imperial agenda of these governments was of crucial significance for the political development of the 
African trade debates, and a much under-studied aspect of the English experience on the coast. This is 
something that the T 70/1198(/9) documents assist in highlighting greatly. 
Understanding the dominant contemporary political issues is crucial to understanding the 
settlement of 1698; not least the shifting political dominance of Parliament and anti-Restoration views 
since the Revolution of 1689-90. Due to the War of the League of Augsburg, England for the first 
time had a national debt with the national bank, The Bank of England, established in 1694. By 1701 
this had reached £14.1million.9 There was little let up from this, with the War of Spanish Succession 
underway by for England by May 1702, affecting commercial trading prospects deeply. Warfare had 
driven the costs of the nation upwards at a dramatic rate, and further investment abroad was called 
upon by some to be the answer to many of these economic questions. With this too came the 
investment already placed in the plantations of the West Indies and North American mainland 
                                                          
7
 William St Clair; The Grand Slave Emporium: Cape Coast Castle and the British Slave Trade (London, 2006) p.36. 
8
 K G Davies; The Royal African Company (New York, 1975) p.121. 
9
 John Brewer; The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 (Harvard, 1988) p.30. 
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throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century. These were not purely commercial polities 
however, and a strong political lobby in the Caribbean especially had been born, with merchants in 
(QJODQGLQYHVWHGKHDYLO\LQWKHSODQWDWLRQV¶VXFFHVVGXHWRWKHWUDGHLQHQVODYHG$IULFDQV,QYHVWPHQW
in the East Indies through the East India Company (EIC) had also become a crucial arm of English 
commercial success with stock being traded more than 650 times per annum in the late 1680s. This, 
more significantly, was tied inherently to the general trade to the West African coastline too.10 A 
bustling and competitive collection of markets along a 4000 mile stretch of coastline, West African 
trade became the fastest growing extra-European market for English merchants in the eighteenth 
century.11  
Despite this, little focus has been given to the Anglo-African trade as a whole, with historians 
that do focus on the British experience in West Africa tending to focus heavily on the trade in 
enslaved Africans. Rightly, this focus has centred on the largest forced-migration in history, and 
contextualising the trade in enslaved Africans around its detrimental effects to West African societies. 
This has also concentrated its economic implications for the European nations of Britain, Portugal, 
France, Spain, Denmark, Brandenburg and others whom engaged in the trade. The slave trade 
certainly dominated the export market of West Africa, accounting for approximately 90% of all listed 
exportations.12 Further accounts have emphasised the role the Anglo-African trade ± particularly in 
slaves ± SOD\HG LQ WKH VXFFHVV RI %ULWDLQ¶V LQGXVWULDO UHYROXWLRQ (ULF :LOOLDPV¶ GHHSO\ LQIOXHQWLDO
Capitalism and Slavery in many ways has been guilty of influencing much subsequent historiography 
on the British experience in West Africa.13 Joseph Inikori has furthered this approach, but in doing so 
has failed to seriously consider the preceding impact of the West African coast on the manufacturing 
of pre-industrial England in the 1690s and early 1700s, particularly with regard to textiles.14 The 
Company Incomings illustrate strong bilateral trade links established between England and West 
Africa, not just interests in triangular trade, and somewhat apart from the developing slave trade by 
                                                          
10
 Bruce G Carruthers; City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton, 1996) p.13. 
11
 Marion Johnson; The Anglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Leiden, 1990) pp.32-33. 
12
 Johnson; Anglo-African Trade p.40. 
13
 Williams; Capitalism p.210. 
14
 Joseph Inikori; Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic 
Development (Cambridge, 2002). 
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the end of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the Anglo-African trade was one attended by 
commodities with a wide mixture of origin. Although dominated by textiles and iron, these goods 
along with the others that would frequent the West African coast more and more from the 1680s 
would constitute one of the foremost globalised marketplaces for European merchants. Merchandise 
of origin spreading from the Americas to the Far East all had their place in the demands of African 
markets at the turn of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the sheer volume of merchants engaging in the 
African trade was in great part due to the 1698 Act, legitimising the trade as open to merchants 
outside of the regulated RAC. In further understanding the 1698 Act itself, there follows a far deeper 
comprehension of the relationship of the RAC and the separate traders both politically and 
FRPPHUFLDOO\ DV ZHOO DV VHFXULQJ D JUHDWHU NQRZOHGJH RI WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
fortifications that, despite their huge expense, were deemed so fundamental to English success on the 
African coast. 
The Act itself has been given weight in recent years due to its opening of the trade to any who 
wished to engage in England. It decreed;  
³$Q\6XEMHFWVDVZHOODVWKH&RPSDQ\PD\WUDGHWR$IULFDEHWZHHQ&DSH%ODQFKRDQG&DSH
Mount, paying £10 per Cent. for Goods exported; And £10 per Cent. on all Goods, &c. 
LPSRUWHGLQWR(QJODQGRU$PHULFDIURP$IULFD´15  
It is evident the sheer numbers that sought to capitalise on this trading too, as even after the spike of 
separate trader activity in 1700, there were still more than double the separate traders than there were 
company voyages engaging the coast in 1703-4, when non-company trading was at its lowest.16 Yet, 
this was not the central focus of the act. Fundamentally, the Act was about reinforcing the English 
colonial presence in West Africa, deeming this essential to a productive commerce as well as a strong 
imperial ideology. 7KH RSHQLQJ VWLSXODWLRQ RI WKH DFW ZDV WKDW WKH ³5R\DO $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\ VKDOO
mDLQWDLQDOOWKHLU)RUWV&DVWOHVHWFDQGVXSSO\WKHVDPHZLWK0HQ$UWLOOHU\HWF´,WFRQWLQXHG³>WKH
                                                          
15
 'William III, 1697-8: An Act to settle the Trade to Africa. [Chapter XXVI. Rot. Parl. 9 Gul. III. p. 5. n. 2.]', in Statutes of 
the Realm: Volume 7, 1695-1701, ed. John Raithby (s.l, 1820), pp. 393-397 http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol7/pp393-397. Date Accessed: 23/02/15. 
16
 William A Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW7KH5R\DO$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\DQGWKH3ROLWLFVRIWKH$WODQWLF6ODYH7UDGH-
1752 (North Carolina, 2013) p.13. 
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RAC] shall maintain support and defend all such Forts and Castles as the said African Company now 
have in their Possession or shall hereafter purchase oUHUHFW´,QVKRUWERWKWKH5$&DQGWKHSRVW-
1689 governments concluded that the protection of the forts was not only the job of the RAC, but was 
of the utmost importance to the preservation of African trade, which in turn was of fundamental 
importance to the state. Only once this was established was it decreed that,  
³$Q\ RI WKH .LQJ¶V 6XEMHFWV DV ZHOO DV WKH &RPSDQ\ PD\ WUDGH WR $IULFD EHWZHHQ &DSH
Mount and the Cape of Good Hope, paying £10 per Cent. And the better to enable the said 
Royall African Company their Successors and Assigns to maintain the said Castles and 
)RUWV´17 
6ROLGLI\LQJ WKH &RPSDQ\ VHWWOHPHQWV DV WKH $FW¶V QXFOHXV LW WKHQ LPPHGLDWHO\ VWDWHG WKDW Whe ten 
percent duty would be IRUWKH³VROHSXUSRVH´RI³SD\LQJIRUWKHIRUWV´. Between 1699 and 1712, over 
£52,500 was harvested through the Incomings and Outgoings books to maintain the forts, a figure 
which seemed pitifully lower than needed given the £400,000 loss incurred through the War of 
Spanish Succession. The years of 1702 and 1703 alone garnered over £72,000 for the separate traders. 
Indeed, the records give a false perception of the trade, this must be remembered, that the duties were 
being paid by all separate traders. This is not the case, clearly, as is displayed numerous times in the 
pamphlets surrounding the act. Davenant himself wrote in 1709 that the separate traders ³QHYHUIDLOHG
to magnify and improve any casual loss or misfortune which happened to the company during the late 
ZDU´18  
The act itself says many things. It was significant in establishing an opening of the slave trade 
whilst still maintaining elements of the 5$&¶V PRQRSRO\ It also suggests that the RAC and the 
separate traders were to have a less tense relationship given the right both recognised the other to have 
in trading. Separate traders would even be given the right to establish factories (although this did not 
RFFXUVLJQLILHGDVWKH&URZQDQG6WDWH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRQ the African coast. Furthermore, the act 
was not limited to the trade in enslaved Africans, rather acknowledged the Anglo-African trade in its 
                                                          
17
 An Act to settle the Trade to Africa (1698). 
18
 Davenant; Reflections upon the Constitution and Management of the African Trade (London, 1709) in Charles Whitworth; 
The Political and Commercial Works of that Most Celebrated Writer Charles Davenant (London, 1771)  p.89. 
12 
 
entirety. It is important to note that, with the exception of Gold, Silver and Africans themselves, the 
taxation paid to the RAC was to cover all goods significant in the African trade. Regarding 
Incomings, this was largely Ivory, Redwood (taxed at 5%) and Beeswax. Regarding Outgoings 
however, this encompassed virtually any commodity, given Africa being its destination and the 
purpose of its inclusion to be traded in Africa. Alongside this, was the allowance of goods such as 
copper to be re-exported to Africa whilst importation was strictly prohibited. Furthermore, this act 
was temporary. Expiring after thirteen years, it was not viewed by many a permanent solution to the 
burgeoning concerns of private interests in Africa. Indeed, this was a compromise the RAC had 
achieved in attaining, yet whilst some monopoly privilege survived it was nevertheless a slow 
progression towards no support for their forts and factories, and no right to tax separate traders in 
1712. This was exactly the case that in both the Incomings and Outgoings documents, 12th July 1712, 
WKH QRWDWLRQV FHDVHG DQG WKH WD[ ZDV UHGXQGDQW DQG ZLWKRXW GRXEW ³7KH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH $IULFD
WUDGHGHEDWHVLQOHIWWKHVHSDUDWHWUDGHUVVXSUHPHLQWKHVODYHWUDGH´19 What remains here is the 
discussion of the wider inferences of these documents left by the RAC, and their effect on areas both 
global and domestic. 
+LVWRULDQV¶YLHZVKDYHGLIIHUHGZLGHO\RQWKHUHDVRQVDQGVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHDFW.*'DYLHV
the QRWHGWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\KLVWRULDQRIWKH&RPSDQ\HPSKDVLVHGWKH³QDWLRQDORSSRVLWLRQ´EXLOWXS
by the anti-monopolist campaigners, with towns from Whitehaven to Kingsbridge given little 
significance by the RAC in their involvement with the Anglo-African trade. As such, many were 
LQFOLQHG WR VXSSRUW WKH VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV¶ FDXVH20 This was furthered by the support of the cities of 
Bristol and Liverpool, whom rejected the metropolitan centralisation of the trade in London. 
Sympathies of this view came from further afield, in the plantation communities of Maryland, 
Virginia, Barbados and Jamaica, homogenous in their desire for an increase in the volume of enslaved 
Africans to their ports they believed the separate traders would bring.21 Considered a grave defeat, the 
1698 Act was marked the end of political and economic significance for the Company by Davies. 
                                                          
19
 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW p.192. 
20
 Davies; African Company p.130. 
21




his views that it led to the perpetual decline and growing insignificance of the Royal African 
Company are quite deeply premature.22 His emphasis on the binary nature of the arguments between 
monopolists and separate traders fails to give significance to the complex and layered arguments and 
interests of all those that were affected by the Anglo-African trade. Placing the 1698 Act as the final 
nail in the coffin for the Company fails to appreciate the colonial responsibility the Act had cemented 
the RAC with, the significance of imperialistic intentions in Africa to the English state, as well as the 
influence it had over other such companies of the day. Commercially, Davies does make clear the 
&RPSDQ\¶V VKRUWFRPLQJV though; separate traders managed to transport around 75,000 enslaved 
Africans to the Americas 1698-1709, with the Company transporting around 18,000.  Financially, the 
Act failed to provide the funds necessary for maintaining the forts. Raising £53,741, it was nowhere 
near the estimated £273,172 required.23 Yet these conclusions veneer the deeper significance of the 
1698 Act. 'DYLHV¶ view has been revised by William Pettigrew, asserting the Company, in his words, 
³DFKLHYHG D UHPDUNDEOH VWDWXWRU\ YLFWRU\´ LQ  3DUOLDPHQW KDG SURYLGHG D UHSULHYH IRU WKH
company by recognizing its charter, although at the price of opening the slave trade to the separate 
traders for twelve years, with a levy of 10 percent on the value on most merchandise to pass to and 
IURPWKH:HVW$IULFDQFRDVW,QUHDOWHUPVE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VVKDUHRIWKHWUDGHKDGSOXPPHWHG
to 8 percent, having been 88 percent in 1690 and the Company struggled to remain a significant force 
both in London and West Africa.24 Both historians yet remain agreed that this was an argument of free 
trade and monopoly with two mutually exclusive antithetical ideologies. In the difficulties of the 
Anglo-African trade however, the reality was far more pragmatic.  
Both historians offer 1698 as a definitive turning point for the Company, one perceiving it 
ultimately as disastrous. In mounting debt by 1709, the Company had ceased trading entirely in the 
same year. 25  3HWWLJUHZ¶V DVVHUWLRQV of a statutory victory are correct, and in many ways even 
understated. The Company maintained its charter, as well as maintaining the right to the cargoes of 
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 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW pp.37-9. 
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any interlopers found not paying the 10 per cent duty. Although cases were rare, those found 
interloping the duty were to have their assets forfeited with;  
³2QHWKLUGSDUWRIDOORUDQ\RIWKH)RUIHLWXUHVDIRUHVDLGVKDOOEHWRWKH8VHRIKLV0DMHVWLHKLV
Heirs and Successors One other third part to and for the Use of the Company and their 
Successors to be applyed for the Maintenance of the said Forts and Castles and the other 
Third part to and for the Use and Benefit of him or them that shall inform and sue for the 
VDPH´ 
Outside of the Act were witnessed some further strengths of the RAC. Adapting to the ruling of 
Parliament, and surviving for far longer than was to be expected by anyone in 1701, the Company 
managed to co-operate in the African trade with the separate traders frequently. Although presented as 
uncompromising, antithetical opponents of the trade by contemporary writers such as Davenant and 
Defoe and modern historians alike, the Company managed to share voyages, vessels and even cargo 
with numerous separate traders to Africa, as the Outgoings and Incomings illustrate. The 1698 Act 
legislated in favour of the Company given its colonial role in West Africa, and Parliament prioritised 
this over commercial activities in which the Company subsequently begin to suffer. Regardless of this 
KRZHYHU LW EHFRPHV FOHDU WKDW WKH  $FW ZDV UXOLQJ LQ WKH $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\¶V IDYRXU WKURXJK









I ± Back and Forth: The Outgoings and Incomings of the Royal 
African Company 
Methodological Assessment26 
Recorded separately WKH WD[ ERRNV RI WKH &RPSDQ\ HQWLWOHG µIncomings¶ DQG µOutgoings¶ FRQWDLQ
many distinctive insights into the trade, if a few discrepancies. Given their separation for imports and 
exports (including re-exports), the forthcoming details in this chapter have been split accordingly. 
Ultimately, the purpose of the documents were for tax collection ± the listing of cargoes and their 
owners making it easier to deduct ten per cent of their value, and maintaining a record of whom was 
paying their dues to the Company. This provides clarity when assessing the data as, for the most part, 
there exists a uniform structure, with chronologically entered cargoes and the commodities contained 
within. Far more detail was kept than this however.27 After annotations of the year, month and day for 
each cargo (or collection of cargoes), there follows a recording of the ship name, captain, owner(s) of 
cargo, and the list of goods and commodities contained within.28 Separate from this, the recorded 
values of the goods and the taxation paid. This was the basis for the data analysis compiled in this 
work, and subsequent columns were added for assessment and, with the set of information presented, 
formatting and analysing the documentation becomes possible. Added into the table was a column for 
denoting whether the cargo is owned by the RAC or a separate trader, information only partially given 
by the documents. Separated columns purporting the cargo and ship owners were constructed and 
colour coded in reference to their political alignment. This was not simply the difference between 
Company and private traders, as stated before, but cross-referencing those whom were active 
politically - engaged in the pamphlet debates -and those whom were not. This was also done with 
those listed as separate slave traders.29 It also gave allowance for other such columns dictating the 
geographic origin of the goods in the cargo. EDVW µ,QGLDQ¶ µ$PHULFDQ¶ µ(XURSHDQ¶ DQG µ'RPHVWLF¶
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 Also see Methodological Appendix.  
27
 See Methodological Appendix for assessment of ships in port.  
28
 Although not of prime importance to this study, it is also worth mentioning that when two instances of ships are noted 
ZLWKLGHQWLFDOQDPHVQXPHURXV\HDUVDSDUWLIWKH&DSWDLQ¶VQDPHLVDOVRGLIIHUHQW then it is treated as a different ship. 
Indeed, with the case of Amity, noted in October 1700 and again in July 1702, the first Captain is Hugh Shaxton, whereas the 
name given in 1702 is Edward Benson, and thus the ships are separated. This is estimation only, however the overall 
significance to this work is minimal ± merely the number of voyages is the concern. 
29
 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW pp.227-234. 
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were all inserted into the spreadsheet illustrating which cargoes contained some, a mixture, or even all 
RIWKHVHWKHDWUHV¶FRPPRGLWLHVLQDVLngle voyage, under an LQYHVWRU¶V possession.  
7KH$FW¶VOHJLVODWHGWD[DWLRQDSSOLHGRQO\WRJRRGVRIWKH$IULFDQWUDGHDQGDVVXFKWKH
Incomings document lists only a handful of recurring commodities. Besides this, the data provided, as 
mentioned in the Data Description (below) is less comprehensive. Kept from 1699-1712, it begins one 
year earlier but finish at the same scheduled mid-July date. Notations were kept in much the same 
way as the Outgoings; the discernible difference for the Incomings being the voyage µ2ULJLQ¶UDWKHU
WKDQµ'HVWLQDWLRQ¶ZKLFKZDVH[SHFWHGRIDGRFXPHQWRILPSRUWDWLRQIssues arise, as often entries are 
placed in a muddled order, with for example entries dated for February, surrounding another for April. 
More frequently are months at a time are left absent of any trade, with entire months being absent 
from 1703 and 1704 notations. Indeed, often whole columns are left blank by the clerks, most 
frequently the name of ships but also the name of captains as well as the place from which they 
travelled. This accounts for some of the irregularity, however many of the months have dates noted in 
a non-chronological order, suggesting poor upkeep in general. Despite this, some voyages are 
traceable in their entirety when matched with the Outgoings VXFK DV µ6KLS &DSWDLQ¶ RQ WKH µShip 
name¶ VDLOLQJ IURP /RQGRQ LQ µDate¶ ZLWK µGoods¶, travelling along the West African coast and 
finall\WRµPlace¶UHWXUQLQJZLWKµ$IULFDQJRRGV¶. These voyages give retrospective suggestions as to 
journey times across the Atlantic and back, and are clear signs of individual slave trading voyages. 
The location listed by the returning voyages in the Incomings provides useful analysis too regarding 
not simply triangular vessels. There was clear evidence, even at face value of the document, of a 
bilateral Anglo-African trade which has been given little assessment by historians at all. Using the list 
of independent slave traders presented in )UHHGRP¶V 'HEW allows for strong estimations of the 
percentage of voyages engaging in the transatlantic slave trade; however this is not possible for those 
whose interests were bilateral. With around 350 traders partaking in just shy of 500 voyages, it 
becomes clear that many of the voyages were not interested in the triangular Atlantic trade. 
It is worth mentioning too, that the nature of these cargoes being listed in bulk means the 
individual values of each commodity per unit remains difficult to decipher. Clearly, as some 
17 
 
commodities are frequently loaded singularly, certain deductions can be made ± iron, for instance, 
averages approximately £15 per ton. While useful for other purposes, measuring values is not the 
purpose of this study ± rather the frequency of which each good appeared, and its origin. Indeed, this 
gives the greatest assistance in assessing the globalised marketplaces of West Africa. Given the 
relatively unprecedented scale of goods documented, it is possible to trace such global goods, with 
demands ranJLQJIURP&DQWRQWR5XSHUW¶V/DQGLQWKHLURULJLQ)XUWKHUPRUHVince the Outgoings and 
Incomings have been recorded separately, it remains wise to document them as such given their lack 
of coordination in their data. Although, in theory, the documents together should form a fairly 
URXQGHG SLFWXUH RI /RQGRQ¶V $IULFDQ WUDGLQJ DFWLYLW\ LQ SUDFWLFH WKHUH LV SDWFK\ FRKHVLRQ 2QO\ D
small fraction of those ships documented leaving London in Outgoings are recorded returning in the 
Incomings. Highlighting the drawbacks of the document mentioned it was clear that the majority of 
merchants and traders active on the West African coast avoided registering their cargo, and thus 
paying the ten percent duty, whenever possible. There are exceptions of course, one being Samuel 
Bonham, the Essex slave-trader, whose Atlantic voyages are chartable from August 1702 ± August 
1711, being frequently documented in both the Outgoings and Incomings.30 However in the following 
descriptions of the data, it is necessary to assess the documents separately.  
Data Description ± Outgoings  
Within contains the GRFXPHQWV¶ record of 677 voyages undertaken by sailors to and from London 
between 1699 and 1712. This data is spread across the two documents, with 372 and 311 recorded 
voyages in the Outgoings and Incomings respectively, documenting 1520 separate cargo loads 
registered for the Outgoings, with 534 for the Incomings. These voyages were conducted with 
involvement from 271 individual ship captains, with 268 individual merchants commercially active in 
the Anglo-African and Atlantic trades alongside the Royal African Company. Many cargo owners 
appear only occasionally and infrequently, or even just the once, whilst the likes of Daniel Jamineau, 
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 Charles Mosley ed.; Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage vol. 1 (Delaware, 2003) p.423. 
 Although Bonham, one of the most traceable of the merchants in the T70 1198/1199 documents, only registers his cargo in 
the Incomings document 50% of the time he is recorded leaving. This is a strong example of the limitation of this document 
in its focus only on London, however it is clear from the volume of voyages noted that other regional ports were not the 
primary cause of gaps in the London data. 
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Anthony Journey, Robert Heysham, Abraham Houlditch and Richard Harris dominate with almost 
25% of the entries being owned by these men alone.31  
 
 (Fig. 1 ± The number of voyages recorded in the Outgoings per annum.) 
 
(Fig. 2 ± The total value of cargoes recorded in the Outgoings per annum.) 
,QYDULDEO\WKHGHVWLQDWLRQIRUWKHFDUJRHVLVOLVWHGDVµ*XLQHD¶RUµ$IULFD¶ZLWKWKHVLQJOHH[FHSWLRQ
of a voyage to Venice in February 1702. There is no discernible difference beWZHHQ µ*XLQHD¶ DQG
µ$IULFD¶ IRU WKH &RPSDQ\ FOHUN JLYHQ WKH IUHTXHQF\ RI H[DPSOHV RI WKH YHU\ VDPH YR\DJH¶V
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destination being listed as one or the other with each cargo load. The cargoes themselves provide 
much in the way of discerning geographical origin of the goods in transit to Africa, with 457 
individual commodities listed in the document from the a smorgasbord of overseas locations. 
Amongst these, Iron was certainly the dominant export, appearing in 596 separate cargo loads on 306 
voyages. Noted almost exclusively as a European good unless written otherwise, the spread becomes 
much more diverse. Tobacco, being the major American re-export, is seen on 239 of voyages, with 
the next seven most prominent goods including, pewter (258), perpetuanoes (240), gunpowder (211), 
spirits (186), down to great bugles (97), being domestic. Subsequently, a smorgasbord of East Indian 
goods are the most frequent, with Calicoes (140), Cowries (133), Nicanees (129),Tapseils (126), and 
Chints (119) being most common. Other European goods, featuring somewhat less frequently, had 
similar individuality defined by their geographic spread in Europe. French cloth, French linens, 
µGermany linens¶, µHolland linens¶, Italian silks and Spanish cloth and woollens were amongst the 
most commonly exported European commodities to Africa. Although the most prominent, these were 
by no means the entirety of the goods shipped, and sporadic assessment continues below. 
Beyond a description of individual commodities, a greater indication of the trends of trade 
exists on a more global basis. Although domestic goods were clearly dominant in frequency, the ships 
varied greatly in the volume of their cargo listed, with many voyages having 5-10 entries, whilst many 
others only one. Significantly, no East Indian good held hegemony over another in the African trade, 
with the overall median of these goods is spread evenly across the recorded voyages in the Outgoings. 
This gave Eastern goods a burgeoning presence in the Anglo-African trade. As shown in Figures 5 
and 6 below in Chapter II, domestic goods unsurprisingly were the most frequently documented 
aboard vessels overall. Goods originating in Europe increased in their frequency too, although given 
the nature of the Anglo-European iron trade at the turn of the C18th, the percentages in Figures 5 and 
6 are reflective of the predominance of iron representing European goods below.32 Nevertheless, the 
cargoes being shipped to West Africa by the turn of the eighteenth century were globalised in the 
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goods they held, with particular significance being placed upon 1708, whereby every vessel sent to 
Africa recorded in the document contained goods from all four geographic marketplaces, highlighting 
the increasingly globalised trade being developed by the first decade of the eighteenth century. 
Further analysis of this, and the year-by-year account of the global nature of these cargoes, is seen 
below. The ownership here, between separate trader and the Royal African Company, as well as those 
with voyages containing cargoes owned by both, is also represented below in figures 3 and 4, Chapter 
II. Most significant were the percentage of voyages conducted with ownership of both the RAC and 
VHSDUDWHWUDGHUVDERDUGµ%RWK¶UHSUHVHQWVQRWRQly the voyages in which independent and Company 
merchandise sat side by side, but any voyage in which separate traders were shipping Company cargo 
on their behalf. 
Significant too, were non-commercial as well as commercial voyages to the West African 
coast by both the Company and separate traders which must be considered. Of the 457 commodities 
listed, approximately 152 were for primarily non-commercial purposes, over one third of the total 
range of commodities exported. The likes of cheese, pork, beef, water stores, water tanks and gallons 
of spirits were shipped predominantly by the RAC. Items of construction were frequently alongside 
this, with, amongst others, handscrews, iron nails, jackscrews, ladders, marline (type of rope), 
mortars, shovels and spades, woodaxes, bricks, wooden planks and wheelbarrows. Tables, chairs, 
furniture both domestic and continental, haberdashery, paint brushes, painters colours and upholstery 
were all transported regularly. Administrative items were the most common, with every year at least 
one shipment filled entirely with RAC ledgers, journals, books, writing books, box, seals and weights, 
SUD\HU ERRNV DQG µSundry Necessaries for the Counting house¶ 0RUH VLJQLILFDQWO\ ZHUH WKRVH
included in the loaded goods which were specific for the establishment of factories. Tools and wares 
PDGHPRUHWKDQRFFDVLRQDODSSHDUDQFHVLQFOXGLQJEXWFKHUVWRROVDSRWKHFDU\ZDUHVDUPRXUHUV¶WRROV
PHGLFLQHV DQG VXUJHRQV¶ LQVWUXPHQWV VPLWKV¶ WRROV DQG LURQPRQJHUV¶ ZDUHV 0LOLWDU\ JRRGV ZHUH
included of course, with trumpets and drums for signalling, as well as fusees, muskets and guns (all 
accompanied with shot), and soldiers coats, colours and uniform. Amongst other more unique items 




were not exclusively shipped by the RAC, and in 1710 and 1711 the four voyages containing factory 
goods were carried exclusively by a single separate trader, Alexander Cleeve. Understanding the 
individuality of the separate traders further gives greater clarity in understanding Anglo-African trade 
as a whole and, as is shown below, the necessary breakdown of the separate traders into those 
politically active and those only commercially active, those who signed pamphlets and petitions and 
those who did not, produces explanations as to why the trade was not solely antagonistic as a study of 
the pamphlet debate would suggest.33 
 
 
Data Description - Incomings 
Although beginning a year earlier in its records, in 1699, the Incomings document is more lacklustre 
in its recordings and annotations than its counterpart, with the data itself somewhat more restrictive in 
the assertions that can be drawn. The failure by the Company clerks to note all of the incoming 
cargoes or the avoidance of paying the duty by these ships, or increasingly the docking of these ships 
DWRQHRI%ULWDLQ¶VRXWO\LQJSRUWVRULQGHHGDPL[WXUHRIDOORIWKHDERYe, such a conclusion cannot be 
reached. Frequently months are missed, which is most likely a combination of no trade to note in 
FHUWDLQFDVHVDQGDIDLOXUHWRGRVRLQRWKHUVJLYHQWKHIUHTXHQF\LQZKLFKSUHYLRXVGD\V¶JRRGVZLOO
be noted down weeks later. Nevertheless, comment and inference can be made reflecting the overall 
trends suggested in the Outgoings; the twilight of the RAC in vessels returning from the West African 
coast, the consistent collaboration between Company and separate trader, and a small collection of 
entire voyages of vessels, recorded leaving and re-entering London.  
 Indeed, the declining trend of Company trade is made more definitive in the Incomings 
document. The voyages for the Company again cease in 1709, with a decline in their number from 
1700 onwards. These voyages were in every respect fewer, with the Company and Separate traders 
engaging in a total of approximately 194 recorded returning voyages in total, with only 33 undertaken 
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exclusively by the Company. As a result, it is difficult to assess the two documents together, with only 
a handful of journeys recorded in their entirety. What is clear however, is that many whom were 
paying their duties on the chief goods brought back from Africa ± ivory, redwood dyes, beeswax, gum 
± were absent from mention in the Outgoings. This furthers to highlight the nature of T 70/1198 and 
1199 as giving a false perception of the Anglo-African trade. Many defrauded the Company out of 
significant sums, not least Robert Heysham, the largest sugar importer to Britain after the RAC in the 
late 1690s, whom was known to have avoided payment to the Company the value in excess of 
£80,000.34 Despite this, and despite his previous role as a Company director, Heysham, the epitome of 
an anti-Company man, was one of the few to be seen making payment in both the Incomings and the 
Outgoings, and thus could not avoid payment of the tax entirely.  
Furthermore, where in the Outgoings ZDV OLVWHG WKH FDUJRHV¶ LQWHQGHG GHVWLQDWLRQ IRU WKH
Incomings this was noted as the origin of the voyage entering London. With occasional entry of 
European and North African cities and nations ± Lisbon, Ireland, Larache - Most recurrent of these 
were Barbados, Jamaica, Nevis, Virginia and Maryland in the Americas, with another significant 
collection of voyages returning directly from the West African coast itself. Indeed, the data confesses 
that of those voyages recorded, approximately 66% were engaged in the triangular trade to either the 
Americas, whilst around 34% of voyages were focussed on a bilateral Anglo-African trade. In this 
document alone there are two clearly separated trades existing in parallel, with the triangular trade 
being concerned with the slave trade whilst the bilateral trade was not. The triangular trade, 
furthermore, was exclusively commercial in its interests, and any vessels intent on maintaining the 
forts and castles of the West African coast was usually engaging only between the forts and London. 
Whilst relatively unremarked upon by historians, the document highlights what was at the time clearly 
a large political lobby, as will be looked at, given the duty on redwood in the 1698 Act being halved 
to 5%. This closely ties to the textile lobby in England which had proved itself as a powerful force in 
banning East Indian imports, representing the single largest English industry at the turn of the 
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eighteenth century.35 It was clear that specific goods ± such as redwood dyes ± were of greater interest 
to the textile industries of Britain, and there was a separation for many between the slave trade and the 
µFRQYHQWLRQDOFRPPRGLW\¶WUDGHWKDWH[LVWHGDVWZRLQGHSHQGHQWVWUDQGVRIWKH$QJOR-African trade. 
Something mentioned by Marion Johnson, it is explored further below.36 Inikori dates these African 
influences on English textile markets to begin predominantly in the 1760s. Despite their flaws, the 
most significant portrayal in the Incomings book of this is undoubtedly the wealth of bilateral trading 
that is present. Chapter 2 illustrates these bilateral connections regarding redwood, discussing further 
the power of clothier and dyeing lobbies surrounding the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa.   
Overall, great FDUH QHHGV WR EH WDNHQ ZKHQ XVLQJ WKH 5$&¶V WD[ ERRNV KRZHYHU LQ QRW
misrepresenting the Anglo-African trade as a whole. The central issue contained within them is they 
give a false impression of African trade. Whilst in keeping with the arguments of the slave trade 
debates, that there were many merchants exterior to the RAC interested in trading to Africa, the 
documents severely underrepresent this demographic. Recent work has covered much ground in 
understanding not just the large-scale independent traders such as Robert Heysham, Humphrey 
Morice, Daniel Jamineau and Abraham Houlditch, but of the occasional traders to Africa too.37 The 
RAC was given the authority to register and tax all outgoing and incoming cargo that was to engage 
in trade between Cape Blanche and the Cape of Good Hope ± where the RAC forts were ± and exports 
only between Cape Mount and the Cape of Good Hope ± where the majority of slaves were. 
Shipments recorded in the sources remain only a percentage of all which voyaged to Africa however. 
Taking outgoings year on year, one would assume the decline of 238 shipments in 1702 to 109 in 
1711 and similarly with incomings, slipping from 108 in 1700 to only 21 in 1711, represented the 
entire Anglo-African trade. Alone, the documents represent a declining trade, a weakening Anglo-
African connection and the 1698 tax perturbing merchants from engaging in trade to the West African 
coast. In reality of course, the greatest indication that African trade was booming, despite the ongoing 
War of Spanish Succession, was that the number of enslaved Africans transported to the Americas in 
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the fifteen years after 1698 rocketed by 300 percent. Fifteen years prior to 1698, 5,500 enslaved 
Africans were transported to the Americas. A decade and a half subsequent, this figure was 15,000.38 
The boom of slave trading experienced in 1700 and 1701 as a result of the 1698 Act would not see the 
same volume of slaves traded until 30 years later, in 1729.39 Subsequently then, the books would also 
suggest a decline in the volume of East Indian linen re-exports to Africa, however given the ban of 
their importation in 1701 and a boom of East India Company goods as re-export commodities 
thereafter, as well as the growth of demand for them in Africa, this was not the case. Meanwhile, the 
ERRNVGRVXSSRUWVXFKVWDWLVWLFVWKDWWKHJURZWKRIWKHVHSDUDWHWUDGHUV¶VKDUHRIWKH$IULFDQPDUNHW
grew from 3 percent to 96 percent, 1689-1720, however with the assumption, again, that overall trade 
declines.  
Ultimately, the tax books highlight that a fundamental transformation was underway in how 
the African trade was conducted after the 1698 act was passed. Contrary to what has been asserted 
hitherto, the act forced the Company into increasing cooperation and collaboration with the separate 
traders as much as they had been at loggerheads with them in the pamphlet campaigns in the 1690s. In 
this respect, although the overall volume of Company trade was to decline in this period, this was 
DUJXDEO\DVPXFKD µGHIHDW¶ IURPVHSDUDWH WUDGHUFRPSHWLWLon as it was a reorganisation of the best 
possible use of Company resources ± heavily reduced by 1705 ± into assuring that the forts and 
factories of Africa could be maintained. The 1698 act was, although a formal challenge to the Royal 
$IULFDQ &RPSDQ\¶V Ponopoly, a significant achievement of survival given the rampant anti-
monopoly campaigns nurtured by opposition to the Company in the 1690s, as well as the 
unfavourable government born out of the 1688-9 Revolution as well as the settled Whig Junto. 
Whereby 3HWWLJUHZ DVVHUWV WKDW WKH &RPSDQ\ µDFKLHYHG D UHPDUNDEOH VWDWXWRU\ YLFWRU\¶ WKLV ZDV
undoubtedly true given the circumstances the RAC faced, yet also continues to highlight the inherent 
strengths of the RAC post-1698. Collaboration with one fifth of the merchants present in the tax 
books, and over a quarter of the voyages presented, gives significance to the argument that the 
&RPSDQ\¶VORQJ-standing interaction with the African trade allowed a basis for other separate traders 
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to engage within it. The RAC¶V LQDELOLW\ WR VKLS ODUJH TXDQWLWLHV RI JRRGV alone is certainly 
represented in the documents too; however juxtaposing this is a clear evolution of the Company in 
these years, and its ability to work in cooperation with the independent merchant traders in order to 
survive as a political, colonial and commercial entity. The ability of the Company to collaborate with 
numerous separate traders ± including staunch political rivals ± was as much a mark of its strengths as 
anything else. 
 The African settlement was also a unique one. An unprecedented solution to the trading 
debates of Africa, there were no synonymous solutions to that of 1698. As Erikson has shown in 
recent assessments, private trade may have been tolerated in other companies such as the EIC; 
however it did so internally, with the settlement reached for the East India Company being one of 
separation that turned out to be only temporary.40 Rather than encourage and invest in the private 
trade of an exclusive Company, the private trade of private investors, merchants and traders were able 
WRHQJDJHLQWKLVWUDGHDOPRVWHQWLUHO\XQUHJXODWHGZLWKWKH&RPSDQ\¶VDVVHWVSULQFLSDOO\DQGDOPRVW
exclusively circumventing the colonial presence of England in West Africa. Ultimately, it is laid bare 
to witness LQWKHWD[ERRNVRIWKH5$&WKHHSLWRPHRIERWKWKH&RPSDQ\¶VZHDNQHVVHVDQGVWUHQJWKV
at the turn of the eighteenth century, the complex political developments surrounding the Africa trade 
debates in this period. It is within the pages of these documents the priorities of the Company emerge, 
solidifying its commitment to the forts in Africa, but also using the advantages of a legitimately open 
trade to continue fulfilling these commitments despite overwhelming competition. Historiography has 
nevertheless positioned the Company and separate traders at juxtaposed commercial ambitions. 
Although the pamphlet debates of the 1690s lean heavily toward their ideological differences, the 
practical implications of trade presented in the Outgoings and Incomings on reflection make the 
rhetoric seem a little extreme. What is revealed by the Company Outgoings is a hidden mechanism of 
the Anglo-African trade not highlighted by the 1698 Act, nor contemporary pamphlet debates, nor 
even modern scholarly assessment. Assessing these arguments of the pamphlet debates surrounding 
the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa is what must follow. 
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II ± Traders and their Trades 
1698 and the African Trade debates 
The statutory victory the Royal African Company achieved in 1698 was hard-won. The 
SDPSKOHWHHULQJ FDPSDLJQV DQG SHWLWLRQV RI WKH V ZHUH UHOHQWOHVV DQG WKH &RPSDQ\¶V VXSSRUW
although featuring some well-connected individuals, was never as broad as that of the separate 
traders.41 Indeed, the RAC was battling against arguments centuries older than itself - the idea of a 
freedom for all merchants to engage in trade; an idea that through the revitalised attacks from the likes 
of Roger Coke in the 1670s, as well as the spread of commercial wealth amongst the merchant 
populace, was gaining significant ground. 42  The Glorious Revolution had brought about a shift 
towards greater openness within commerce at home and abroad too. For decades the plantation 
colonies had frequently declared a desire for a louder voice in the Atlantic trading system and in the 
1690s this began to be recognised. Dalby Thomas made demands for  
³$JUHDW&RXQFHOORf Trade, to consist of members Elected and Deputed by every Plantation, 
Marritime, City, Company, Constitution and Trade, which would desire to send Members to 
it: And from thence after a free and full examination be represented to both Houses of 
ParliamenWIRUWKHLU$SSUREDWLRQRU'LVOLNH´43 
The Company had begun to feel the impact of challenges its monopoly, most directly from the ruling 
of Chief Justice Sir John Holt in Nightingale v Bridges, 1689.  Subsequent to this, interloping 
increased dramatically, and the ruling, combined with Dockwra v. Dickinson, 1696, forced the 
Company to abandon any legal claim to seize interloping ships, and repay damages of over £4,300.44 
By 1698 this had culminated in a compromised settlement that allowed all to engage in trade whilst 
paying a duty to the Company which would maintain the English forts in Africa. The 1698 Act and its 
effects would dominate the trading debates for fifteen years subsequently. The effects of the Act 
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ZRXOGNHHS WKH&RPSDQ\¶V LQWHUHVWV XQLWHGKDYLng their fundamental arguments recognised by the 
VHWWOHPHQWZKLOVWWKHVHSDUDWHWUDGHUV¶XQLW\ZRXOGIUDFWXUHLQDWWHPSWVWRUHFRQVWLWXWHWKHWUDGHXSRQ
its expiry. The arguments of the RAC would become adopted by the separate traders. The forts, which 
had been the central gripe of the anti-monopolists in the 1690s, would be recognised by many separate 
traders as integral to a prosperous Anglo-African trade. Moreover, the parliamentary ruling of 1698 
cemented the imperial ambitions of the state in West Africa, which the Royal African Company had 
long represented.45 
Although much of the DUJXPHQWV¶ FRQWHQW did not change, the African Trading debates 
progressed significantly in little over a decade from the statutory compromise of 1698. Indeed, both 
Davies and Pettigrew have divided study of the political campaigns in the formative years of the 
HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\'DYLHV¶DSSURDFKZDVRQHZKLFKOHGWRRQZDUGVEHLQJGHILQHGE\WKH5$&
concentrating its efforts towards securing such modification of the Act of 1698 as would encourage 
the investment of fresh capital.46 Nevertheless, Davies also asserts that no great change came in the 
demographic make-up of both the pro- and anti-Company arguments, with only the addition of the 
broader Scottish mercantile interest opposing the RAC since the Act of Union in 1707. Pettigrew 
GHQRWHV WKH VKLIW LQ DUJXPHQWV WKHPVHOYHV ZKHUHE\ WKH VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV¶ DUJXPHQWV RI WKH ODWH-
VHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\KDGIRFXVHGRQWKHLU³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWWRGHVWUR\HFRQRPLFUHVWULFWLRQV´7he 
post-1707 debates, triggered by the Board of Trade enquiries, steered the traders to an argument that 
³FHOHEUDWHG IUHHGRP WR WUDGH DQG RSHQ FRPSHWLWLRQ DV VXUHU EXWWUHVVHV WR QDWLRQDO ZHDOWKWKDQ DQ
DUELWUDU\ VWDWH´47 The ideology of the separate traders certainly did develop, although it would be 
SUREOHPDWLF WR DVVXPH WKDW ERWK WKH &RPSDQ\¶V SURSRQHQWV DQG RSSRQHQWV ZHUH XQLWHG LQ WKHLU
UHVSHFWLYHSROLWLFDOHIIRUWV*LYHQWKH$FW¶VYHQWXUHLQWRSUHYLRXVO\XQWURGGHQVWDWXWRU\JURXQG
it was unsurpULVLQJ WKDW WKLV IUDFWXUHG WKH SROLWLFDO RSSRQHQWV RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VROLGDULW\ RI DLPV
especially. Surrounding the expiry of the 1698 Act in 1712 was, overwhelmingly, confusion as to 
what this signified. WKLOVWWKH&RPSDQ\SRLQWHGWRWKH&UHGLWRUV¶$FWDVDUHLQVWDWHPHQWRIWKH5$&¶V
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privileges on the West African coast, the separate traders had categorically illustrated their superiority 
regarding the commercial trade to Africa.48 $VLVQRWHG³7KH$IULFD7UDGHGHEDWHVFRQFHQWUDWHGRQ
the problem of who ought to have access to the slave trade. The separate traders had conclusively won 
WKDWLVVXH´49 However this in no way led to unified separate traders. 
In the year of 1698 pamphleteering became very intense. Those from the Planation lobby 
were concerned they would be hardest hit. One wrote that the, 
³'XW\RISHU&HQW is very unreasonable, and a great deal too much. First, it will fall the 
heaviest on the Plantations, which can least bear the Tax, and are most to be regarded, that 
Duty being so great, will render the Negroes the dearer to them. Secondly it is very 
unreasonable to pay the Company so great a Duty, where they are at no Charge to maintain 
WKH)RUWVRU&DVWOHV´ 
Whilst the Company had certainly briefly occupied factories in the 1670s and 1680s at Offra and 
Whydah on the Slave Coast, no permanent settlements there had been made by 1698.50 Frequently 
mentioned was the critique that whilst all had to pay for the fortifications to be maintained, in 1698 
there existed no RAC forts west of the Gold Coast, on the Slave Coast or beyond, where the majority 
RI$IULFDQVZHUHSXUFKDVHG³)URP5LYHU9XOWXV>9ROWD@WR$QJRODDQGWR&DSH*RRG-KRSH«WKHUHLV
QRWRQH)RUWQRU&DVWOH QRU DQ\WKLQJ OLNHRQHQRUZLOO WKH1HJURHVSHUPLW DQ\ WREHEXLOW´51 The 
expense of establishing a new fort was ground well-trodden in the pamphlet debates of the 1690s, 
with a conservative estimate for one potential fort in Gambia costing approximately £20,000 to 
establish, and a further £6,000 p.a. to maintain.52 Cheaper to capture a foreign factory it may have 
been, however engagements seen by the RAC in the Nine Years War had rendered the company 
largely ineffective for combat both during and subsequently. The Company itself had noted within the 
General Court the damage inflicted by the French seizure of their fort James in Gambia during the 
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conflict, and with it some control of the Senegambia trade.53 In the same report the Company was 
adamant that their trade in Africans was not a focus in Gambia or in Ghana, with a commercial 
interHVWSUHGRPLQDQWO\LQ³KLGHVZD[HOHSKDQWVWHHWKDQGUHGZRRGEXWIHZ1HJURHV´54 A pamphlet 
submitted the year before on behalf of the plantations echoed this sentiment, with a clear awareness of 
WKHSODQWDWLRQV¶RZQFHQWUDOLW\WRDSURVSHURXV$WODQWLFWUDGH³7KH,QWHUHVWRIWKH3ODQWDWLRQVDUHRI
infinitely greater concern to be preserved, than any Company with a Joint-VWRFN FDQ SUHWHQG WR´55 
Even once the Bill had been passed through the Commons the lobbying continued. One pamphlet 
pleaded with the LorGV³WKLV%LOO LQPDQ\3DUWLFXODUV OD\VJUHDWHardships, and almost insuperable 
'LIILFXOWLHV RQ WKH 7UDGH WR $IULFD´ DQG WKDW WKH 'XW\ RI  SHUFHQW ZDV ³YHU\ %XUWKHQVRP DQG
'LVFRXUDJLQJ´56 
Even in the 1690s, the tone of the pamphlets of the Plantations was somewhat more 
ideologically charged in the language used than its domestic counterparts centred in England. The 
politically active separate traders in England and the colonies demanded an open trade to Africa, and 
this became ideologically aligned with the beliefs of the Plantation owners not just through the 
mutual-benefit in the supply and demand of enslaved Africans to the Americas. Yet both successive 
monarchs and Parliaments believed they required, to a greater or lesser degree, omnipotence over 
British commercial activity. It was acknowledged almost universally by the end of the seventeenth 
century that the success of the trade was inherently linked to the success of the state. Nevertheless, the 
English trade to Africa developed into an open one unlike those to the East Indies, Muscovy, the 
Mediterranean and other parts of the globe. It has been established principally by Dunn and others that 
the colonial societies diverged dramatically from the English models that would develop at the turn 
of, and throughout the eighteenth century.57 Whilst British commerce would continue to be influenced 
by the protectionist policies of the Navigation Acts laid out in the seventeenth century, the Anglo-
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African trade became the unique experience for English and British merchants after 1712. Although 
existing outside of direct involvement with the political landscape of London, the Plantation 
communities were still very much engaged with, and aware of, the political developments of the 
Anglo-African trade throughout the 1690s. Many, such as Edward Littleton, were some of the first to 
ZULWH LQ VXSSRUW RI WKH LGHD RI DQ RSHQ WUDGH WR $IULFD QRWLQJ IDPRXVO\ WKDW ³WKH RQFH IORXULVKLQJ
(QJOLVK &RORQLHV KDYH EHHQ EURXJKW WR UXLQH´58 Within this account too existed some of the more 
potent language dissecting the relationship between the plantations and the nation.  
³,Q)RUPHUWLPHVZHDFFRXQWHGRXUVHOYHVDSDUWRI(QJODQGDQGWKH7UDGHDQG(QWHUFRXUVH
was open accordingly so that Commodities came hither as freely from the Sugar Plantations, 
DVIURPWKH,VOHVRI:LJKWRU$QJOHVH\%XWXSRQWKH.LQJ¶V5HVWDXUDWLRQZHZHUHLQHIIHFW
made Forainers and Aliens: a Custom being laid upon our Sugars amongst other Forain 
&RPPRGLWLHV´ 
³+HUHWRIRUH ZH FRXOG 6KLS RII RXU *RRGV DW DQ\ 3Rrt, or Bay, or Creek; and at any time, 
either by day or by night. But now since the Kings Restauration we must do it at those Times 
and Places only, at which the Collectors of the Customs please to attend. Heretofore we might 
send our Commodities to any part of the World. But now we must send them to England, and 
WRQR3ODFHHOVH´59 
Littleton may have been emphasising the alienating damage the now deposed James II had 
done to the plantations economically and  politically, however the effect was a sustained one, 
illustrated in the lobbying centred around the African trade debate in general, and the 1698 Bill. 
Although loosely ideologically connected, the Plantation mentality had diverged significantly in 
mind-set from the separate traders of London by the eighteenth century because of the political 
community and society that therein existed. Removed from the responsibility of maintaining a nation, 
whilst relying on the Royal Navy for defence, the plantation owners were focussed exclusively on 
turning a greater profit from their factories, and thus urged a free trade to their communities, alienated 
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by the metropolitan. Although this identity has been discussed much by Jack P Greene and others as a 
causal factor for the American Revolution, as early as the late seventeenth century the rhetorical root 
of these political and identity issues can be clearly witnessed.60 Recurring opposition to imposition by 
both the monarchy and parliamentary authority bred a continuous political battle for pseudo-
autonomy. One central ZD\ WKLVZDVPDQLIHVWHGZDV WKH FRORQLHV¶DGDPDQWRSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH VXJDU
duty, perceiving it unpayable if any form of profit were to be made in trading. The various councils of 
the islands of the West Indies spoke in something of a single voice in their opposition too, and in 
September 1685 the various Lietenant-Governors of the islands were lobbying the monarch, with 
letters from Barbados and Jamaica being received in London fortnightly.61 The 1698 Act however, 
served as a deeper watershed for this autonomous political identity to emerge than has been 
previously anticipated. Amongst the later trading debates circumventing 1709-1713, there exhibited a 
deep divergence in the ideologies of the separate trading lobby, with splits emerging between not only 
colonial planters and separate traders, but amongst the various domestic traders themselves.  
The pamphlets that appeared in favour of the Royal African Company in the years 1709-1713 
remained very much the bread and butter of the pro-company literature ideology that was witnessed in 
WKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\,QIOXHQFHGJUHDWO\E\'DYHQDQW¶VReflections in 1709, much unity seemed to 
FRPHIURPPLUURULQJKLVGHILQLWLYHDSSURDFK7UDGHZLWKWKH:HVW$IULFDQV'DYHQDQWSURIHVVHG³FDQ
be made only by Princes themselves, or powers derived from them to bodies politick and 
communities...within a society established with the sanction of a parliamentary constitution, and 
having a sufficient joint stock, with exclusive privileges, and a coercive power to maintain their 
DOOLDQFHV DV ZHOO DV WR GHIHQG WKHLU WUDGH´ 62  By 1713, this approach was maintained, with one 
pamphleteer postulating the rather apriori argument that; 
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a Property in their Lands, Forts, Rivers, Coast and Settlements in Africa, and the Benefit the 
3URILWRIµHP([FOXVLYHRIRWKHUVRUHOVHLWFDQEHQR3URSHUW\´63 
In the same year a collection of company representatives petitioned parliament with a drafted bill re-
LQVWDWLQJ WKH 5R\DO $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\¶V PRQRSROLVWLF FKDUWHU ³ZKLFK WKHLU 1HZ 6XEVFULEHUV DUH WR
have Part of; and that by Charter they have a Right to the sole Trade there for 1000 Years to 
FRPHH[WHQGLQJ  PLOHV>DQG ZRXOG@ H[FOXGH DOO (QJOLVK SULYDWH 7UDGHUV´64 Throughout the 
1690s, the RAC had operated on the mandate that their charter was the immutable statutory right for 
their sole access to the West African coast. Their practical ability to engage in trade effectively 
destroyed for the foreseeable future by the separate traders by 1712, the only hope for the Company 
was this perseverance of recognition of their charter. With the fears postulated before 1698 that the 
opening of the trade would be its downfall were disproven, the RAC could unite behind this single 
legal and constitutional argument.   
For the separate traders, the story was very different. In ideology, they had become far less 
united. Separate traders had diverged in their arguments once the economic debate had been won, and 
the monopoly of the RAC overcome. In Britain, growing lobbies interested in the Anglo-African trade 
resulted in growing numbers of ideas as to how the trade should be conducted. In the Caribbean too, 
WKH ULVH RI WKH µPDVWHU FODVV¶ LQ WKH &WK PHUFKDQW-planters whom dominated the plantation 
VRFLHWLHV¶ ODQG SURILWV DQG SROLWLFV LQ HYHU\ ZD\ FRXSOHG ZLWK WKe isolation from the domestic 
political environment in London, placed a huge gulf between the identities of the planters and the 
domestic separate traders, as well as their political ideas. The societies of the Caribbean plantations 
ZHUHµUDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQW¶WRWKRVHLQ%ULWDLQRUHYHQWKRVHLQWKH%ULWLVK1RUWK$PHULFDQPDLQODQG65 
Although sharing in the common goal of deconstruction of the RAC monopoly in the 1690s, the 
SODQWHUV¶ DOOLDQFH ZLWK WKH GRPHVWLF VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV ZDV RQH RI FLUFXPVWDQFH and practicalities. 
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Shared ideologies ran OLWWOH GHHSHU WKDQ D FRPPRQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH LGHDV RI WKHLU µOLEHUW\¶ WR
trade, their rhetorical rights as Englishmen, and of the economic redundancy of the joint-stock 
Company of Anglo-African trade. Much of the mutual understanding between them was that 
plantations particularly in Jamaica, Barbados and the Chesapeake North American mainland were not 
being adequately supplied by the RAC, and separate traders were not being adequately accommodated 
in their desire to trade.66 As a result of this, three distinctive arguments had emerged by 1710; one in 
favour of a continuation of the status quo with no legislation required to trade to Africa, another 
calling for legislation decreeing an open trade, and another, more surprisingly, calling for a new 
UHJXODWHGFRPSDQ\)RUPDQ\WKHGHFOLQHRIWKH5$&¶VPDUNHWVKDUHLQ$QJOR-African trade, as well 
as the swelling of numbers of independent merchants trading to Africa, spoke for itself.67 These 
merchants, as well as the planters of the Caribbean, continued to assert the traditional arguments of 
the anti-PRQRSROLVWVIRUWVRQWKH$IULFDQFRDVWZHUHXQQHFHVVDU\DQGWKH³PLVFKLHIVRIPRQRSRO\´
needed to be prevented.68 It was clear however that many separate traders were wary of the lack of 
statutory legislation confirming their right to trade freely by 1712, and others began arguing for a new 
regulated Company to be established to solidify their individual right to trade. Indeed, in a proposed 
bill for legislating the open trDGH WR $IULFD LQ  LW ZDV GHFUHHG ³7KDW DOO DQG HYHU\ SHUVRQ RU
persons who shall...attempt to Raise or Cultivate any Sugar-Canes, Tobacco or other Commodities 
produced in the British Plantations in America...join with any of the Natives of the Coast of 
$IULFDHYHU\VXFK3HUVRQRU3HUVRQVVKDOOIRUIHLWWKH6XPRI7HQ3RXQGVSHUDQQXP´7KHSURSRVHG
fine of five hundred pounds to any colonial official entering the trade illustrated the clearly precarious 
position some separate traders saw themselves in too.69 Given the high-risk climate of Anglo-African 
trade this was to be somewhat expected, however the value of the proposed fine had risen sharply 
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since 1698.70 The impact of The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was nevertheless clear, with the 
drafted bills heavily modelled on the stipulation of the 1698 Act.  
 The Caribbean plantations had been witnessing more independent control of their 
representation in Westminster throughout the 1690s too. Crucially, this was subsequent to the 
governors of the plantation colonies being chosen predominantly by the merchant-councillors in the 
plantations since the Board of Trade¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW in 1694. 71  The royal and parliamentary 
prerogative in London had been maintaining metropolitan control over the settlements in the 
Americas and moreover Africa from the 1670s onwards. Whilst those on the West African coast held 
great contention for both separate traders and plantation owners in the 1690s restricting Company 
trade, the merchants in Britain were less concerned about metropolitan authority over the 
plantations.72 Deeply concerned by the metropolitan control over their economy that had existed from 
WKHVWRWKHVWKH&DULEEHDQOREE\¶VSULPDU\FRQFHUQZDVWKHLUVRYHUHLJQDELOLW\WRWKULYHDV
independent plantation economies. Increasingly, the risks included the potential plantations on the 
West African coast. Unsurprisingly, this was not of great concern to the domestic separate traders. 
Although cooperative in the formative years of the eighteenth century, with the plantations witnessing 
a boom in the numbers of enslaved Africans shipped to their shores, this move for the plantations 
towards greater economic independence from London was met by the separate traders with wariness 
with the expiry of the Act in 1712. One collection of planters of Jamaica replied simply to the 
proposed bill in 1713 to open trade ³¶WLV KRSHG WKH VDLG %LOO ZLOO QRW SDVV LQWR /DZ´ ,QGHHG LW
reverberated throughout the plantations that their voices remained insignificant to London, even to 
WKRVH ZKRP WKH\ SUHYLRXVO\ KDG VKDUHG D FRPPRQ JRDO ³7KDW QR 3DUW\ RU 3HUVRQV DUH WR EH
$FFRXQWDEOHRU6XEMHFW WRWKH&RPSODLQWVDQG3ODQWHUV IRUQHJOHFWV´ WR WKH WUDGH WKH\ZHUHJUHDWO\
affronted.73 With a deep concern resonating trough the plantation lobby that the interests would be 
recognised second to those of Britain, as the historical narrative had dictated, this split in the separate 
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traders is far clearer. Separated by the Atlantic Ocean they had always been, planters and merchants 
had now been drawn apart by the legacy of the 1698 Act, the duty placed on the trade, and a desire 
from each side to shift this duty onto the other. In this respect, it is hard to see how the African trade 
debates subsequent to 1698 were anything akin to, as Davies sXJJHVWHG ³VR XWWHUO\ EDUUHQ RI
FRQVHTXHQFH´74 
The other great significance of the 1698 Act on the trading debates was the overwhelming 
acceptance on the part of the separate traders that the fortifications of West Africa were essential for a 
profitable trade. One pamphleteer made the case for the shared concerns of the RAC and separate 
WUDGHUVLQ$VZLWKWKLVFHQWUHGPRVWGLVWLQFWLYHO\RQWKHLVVXHRIIRUWVWKH\DJUHHG³7KDW
)RUWVDQG6HWWOHPHQWVEHPDLQWDLQ¶GDQGHQODUJ¶GRQWKDW&RDVW´DQG³That the Charge of maintaining 
VDLG)RUWVDQG6HWWOHPHQWVEHERUQRXWRIWKDW7UDGH´ 75 This had certainly become the focus of those 
separate traders drafting a bill for a new regulated company to the coast as well, with those wishing to 
WUDGHWRWKHFRDVWKDYLQJWREHSHUPLWWHGPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH&RPSDQ\DQGWKDW³DOO0RQLHVSDLGXSRQ
AdmisVLRQV RI )UHHPHQ LQWR WKH VDLG &RPSDQ\VKDOO EH DSSO\¶G E\ WKH VDLG *RYHUQRXU DQG
Company...for supporting and maintaining the British Forts and Settlements erected or to be erected in 
$IULFD´(YDOXDWLRQVRIWKHUHDOFRVWRIWKHIRUWVZHUHWREHSURIIHUed, and a proposal for the RAC to 
sell any factories to the new regulated company deemed too costly were put forward. Furthermore, it 
GHFUHHG³WKDWWKHVDLG&RPSDQ\KHUHE\(VWDEOLVKHGVKDOODQGWKH\DUHKHUHE\DXWKRUL]HGDQGUHTXLUHG
to, make Agreements with the Natives in Africa, necessary for the PresHUYDWLRQRI WKH VDLG7UDGH´
Clearly, a steadfast acceptance of maintaining both the fortifications, and strong relations with the 
various African polities on the coast had occurred. These were acceptances of the Royal African 
&RPSDQ\¶VFRUHDUJXPHQWVDQGQRZWKDWWKHVHSDUDWH WUDGHUVZHUH LQFRQWURORI WKH$QJOR-African 
trade, there had grown recognition of these concerns.76 One trader wrote that the lands which the 
&RPSDQ\KHOG IDFWRULHV ³KDGQHYHUEHHQSXUFKDVHGQRU WKH)RUWVEXLOW DW DYDVW([SHQFH´DQG WKH
LVVXHRIWKHIRUWVUHPDLQHGYHU\PXFKLQWKHSXEOLF¶VPLQGVGXHWRWKHFDXVH-celebre of the African 
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the fortifications at all.77 Regardless of these wishes however, no legislation came to pass in 1712 or 
subsequently, and the trade was laid open. It was argued that as the Company would never allow an 
HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH IRUWV¶ PDLQWHQDQFH FRVWV WUDGHUV ZRXOG EH IRUFHG WR ³SD\ ZKDW WKH\ >WKH 5$&@
SOHDVH WR WKLQND&RPSHWHQW6XP´78 Even this was not wholly representative of the separate trader 
opposition to such proposals however. Regarding the proposed take-over of the fortifications by the 
regulated company, VRPHSURIHVVHG³7KLV%LOOLVVRPHUFLOHVVWRWKHSUHVHQW&RPSDQ\WKDWLWGRWKQRW
VR PXFK DV JLYH WKHP DQ\ WLPHWR EULQJ +RPH WKHLU (IIHFWV RU WR UHFRYHU WKHLU 'HEWV´79 Even 
sympathy for the Company had arisen amongst some separate traders.  
Yet all oIWKHVHVHSDUDWHWUDGHUV¶YDU\LQJYRLFHVRQWKHWUDGHLQSURSRXQGLQJDFKDUWHU
for a new regulated company, attempting to legislate a bill formally opening the trade, and even 
RSHQLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISXUFKDVLQJWKH&RPSDQ\¶VIRUWVZHUHE\QRPHDQs supported by the entire 
separate trader lobby. This highlighted not only how the rhetoric of the pamphleteering campaigns 
had developed hugely since the late-seventeenth century, but how the fortifications had remained at 
the centre of the debate. Now disunited in their ambition, many separate traders, including some of the 
PRVW VXFFHVVIXO DQGZHDOWK\KDG DFFHSWHG WKHVWDWH¶V LPSHULDO DJHQGD UHJDUGLQJ WKH$IULFDQFRDVW
Whilst the reformed Board of Trade from 1696 may have given greater consideration to the concerns 
RI PHUFDQWLOH SUDFWLWLRQHUV DQG ZLWK LW WKH VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV WKH &RPSDQ\¶V UHSHDWHG DUJXPHQWV
surrounding the forts had not fallen on deaf ears. The freedoms of commercial activity may well have 
been permitted to all English traders to the African coast after 1712, but there was no sailing around 
the reality that, just as the RAC had been insisting for over a decade, the forts were as much a part of 
WKH 6WDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ $IULFD DV WKH &RPSDQ\¶V 7KH 5R\DO $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\ PD\ KDYH ORVW
possession of the trade in 1712, but its possession of the forts was only reinforced under the eyes of 
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WKH JRYHUQPHQW :LWK WKLV WKH &RPSDQ\ ZDV QRW DV 'DYLHV VXJJHVWV LQ D µPRULEXQG SRVLWLRQ¶ LQ
terms of its political or imperial significance. 80  Conversely, WKH 5$&¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ RYHU WKHLU
fortifications in Africa gave fervour to an already strong imperial basis. What is more, the ability of 
the Company to work alongside its apparent opponents in the trade gave it further staying power after 
1698. Although much study has surrounded the Company and separate traders, this crucially 
highlights how the issues surrounding them were not simply black and white. The separate traders 
suffered from deep splits in their arguments for an open trade soon after the 1698 Act had been 
passed, not just between the metropolitan and colonies, but amongst themselves in London too. In 
doing so, the central arguments of the RAC and pro-monopolists, namely the necessity of colonial 
settlement in West Africa, were conceded by many who had formerly opposed it. The political 
opposition to the Company was clearly not as stringent as assumed from the pamphlet debates 
themselves ± something which the Outgoings illustrates clearly. 
 
Partners in Trade: The Royal African Company and the Separate Traders 
Shortly after the 1698 act was passed, the Company issued a decree to its factors on the West African 
FRDVW VWDWLQJ ³LW LV RXU GHVLUH WKDW >WKH VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV@ EH SURWHFWHG DQG WUHDWHG civily, but we 
positively expect you should not assLVWWKHPLQEX\LQJRUVHOOLQJJRRGV´81 The Company made certain 
to assure agents on the coast that protection of the separate traders and non-molestation of their trade 
ZDVWREHSROLF\³DVLIWKH\ZHUHRIDQGGLGEHORQJWRWKHFRPSDQ\´82 The Act to Settle the Trade to 
Africa had made clear the legal right of separate traders, as Englishmen, to engage in commercial 
activity with the West African coast, free from harassment from the RAC. These sentiments have 
been broadly reflected in the scholarly work on the politics and economics of the African trade that 
has followed over the last half-century. Many have furthered these assessments, with the likes of 
Davies, Pettigrew, Hugh Thomas and James D Tracy touching on the separate traders of the Anglo-
African trade. In doing so, many have all allured to the conclusion that the relationship that existed 
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between them was akin to an ongoing commercial as well as political battle. 83  The political 
atmosphere of the African trade debates in London, moreover, led to the exaggerated and extreme 
rhetoric witnessed in the pamphlet debates. Historians should expect the political representation of the 
Company and separate trader relationship to exhibit pantomime qualities RIµJRRGYVEDG¶UDWKHUWKDQ
the complexities of collaboration. Not doing so is to overlook the very real partnership that existed 
between the Company and separate traders, dating from the 1690s and continuing to prosper after the 
Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was passed in 1698. Consistent voyages that contained not only 
cargo owned by both the RAC and separate traders, but cargo with shared ownership between these 
politically opposed peoples were hugely prominent in the Anglo-African trade of the early eighteenth 
FHQWXU\)XUWKHU WR WKLV VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV¶KHOG MRLQW-ownership with many of the goods which were 
aboard non-commercial Company merchandise; goods for the forts and settlements of the West 
$IULFDQFRDVW6RPHORDGHGDQGVKLSSHGFDUJRHVRQWRYHVVHOVDORQJVLGHWKHLURZQRQWKH&RPSDQ\¶V
behalf, and even did so after the expiry of RAC voyages to the coast from 1710, with non-commercial 
goods solely for WKH SXUSRVH RI UHVXSSO\LQJ DQG PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V IRUWV DQG IDFWRULHV LQ
West Africa.84 Rather than egregious relationships, there existed a clear mutual effort of independent 
merchants and the Royal African Company in carrying on the trade to West Africa. 
Evidence of collaboration exists in numerous instances elsewhere. There have been 
RFFDVLRQDO QRWDWLRQV PDGH RI WKH 5R\DO $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\¶V FRPPHUFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK VHSDUDWH
WUDGHUVZLWK WKH VORZGHFOLQHRI WKHFRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWVPHDQLQJ WKH5$&³had been driven to trade 
ZLWKWKHWHQSHUFHQWPHQ´IURP'DOE\7KRPDVKLPVHOIDQQRXQFHGKHZDVIRUFHGWRWUDQVDFW
with independent merchants or allow the Ashanti to see English factories bare of goods.85 This was 
unlikely to be the first time he had done so either, having two extremely close and long-time 
associates in Robert Gardiner and Sir Robert Davers, two prolific separate traders. Indeed, the illegal 
private trade by Company governors with separate traders was generally accepted as a practice of all; 
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English, Dutch and Danish.86 Before being appointed to the Company in 1697, Thomas himself was 
an active opponent of the joint-stock, and even dedicated his influential pamphlet on the effect of the 
RAC monopoly on the West Indian colonies to Davers.87  These connections were by no means 
severed after Thomas became a pivotal player for the Company in West Africa. Evidence of 
collaboration was extended by 1710 with an admission that Company merchants would be forced to 
engage with separate traders at Dixcove, Sekondi, Kommenda, Winnebah, and Shido to keep 
Company commerce active at all.88 Such assessments, however, imply that the African Company only 
facilitated trade with the separate traders some years after the 1698 Act, when both the financial 
situation and the number of voyages conducted by the RAC had continued to decline. In reality, 
members of the Company had been trading and voyaging alongside separate traders from the 
EHJLQQLQJ RI WKH 5$&¶V GRFXPHQWDWLRQ Many had previously held high positions in the Company 
too; Robert and William Heysham as well as Peter Paggen. The very first RAC voyages noted in the 
Company Incomings in June 1700, Providence and Blossome, held cargoes owned by both separate 
traders and the Company. This was matched in the Outgoings LQZLWKWKH&RPSDQ\¶VVHFRQG
recorded voyage, Surroso, having cargo loaded and shipped by William Benson and their fourth, 
Christopher, cargo shared with Abraham Lodge. Indeed, this trend continued to grow, and as the 
number of exclusive RAC voyages declined almost consistently year on year, the percentage of 
voyages with shared cargoes rose correspondingly. From 1702 to 1708, there were a consistent 
percentage of shared cargoes averaged at 18%, nearly one fifth of the entire registered trade to West 
Africa in the Company Outgoings. By 1708, these shared cargoes represented the only voyages 
containing African Company goods at all. Both in 1706 and 1707, only a single exclusive voyage was 
undertaken by the RAC each year that did not involve separaWH WUDGHUV¶DVVLVWDQFHFROODERUDWLRQRU
joint-venture. Over the recorded years 1702-1712, only 1702, 1704 and 1709 recorded a greater 
frequency of exclusive RAC voyages to West Africa than shared or collaborative ones.  
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To not engage joint-ventures would clearly have been incredibly problematic for the 
Company. Given the general acceptance among historians that it was not until 1710 that the Company 
was bankrupted and ceased commercial activity altogether, it is clear that from around 1705 the 
Company could only manage to operate at all through cooperation with separate trading merchants. 
Even from 1702, 43% of Company cargoes were shipped with some level of collaboration with 
separate traders. By 1703, this figure had risen to 59%. 
 
(Fig. 3 ± Ownership of cargo aboard each voyage per annum, Representing Separate Traders (ST), 


































(Fig. 4 ± The percentages of ownership of cargo for each voyage per annum.) 
Whilst the T70 1198/1199 documents may give a false impression of the Anglo-African trade overall, 
this fails to apply to the data on cargo ownership. Indeed, we can be confident WKDW WKH 5$&¶V
adherence to the 1698 Act was stringent given this was a document not only to register cargo and 
accurately measure taxation paid to them, but was able to give comparative data on the volume of 
5$&DQGµVHSDUDWH¶WUDGH([FHSWLQJDIHZYR\DJHVIURP%ULVWRODQGRWKHUVPDOOHU(QJOLVKSRUWVLQ
these years, it is certain that these figures of London commerce represent the vast bulk of Company 
FDUJR :LWK VLPLODU VWXGLHV FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW %ULVWRO¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH VODYH WUDGH URFNHWHG SRVW-
 WKHUH ZLOO FHUWDLQO\ EH IXUWKHU GHGXFWLRQV WR GUDZ IURP (QJODQG¶V UHJLRQDO WUDGH DERXW
collaboration.89  
This revelation in the management of Anglo-African trade is one that is relatively in keeping 
with the contemporary mercantile conduct of the early eighteenth century. Not least due to the War of 
Spanish Succession crippling British merchant vessels in the Atlantic, there were clear circumstances 
which created the need for cooperation in trade.90 Shared cargoes in this respect were not unusual, 
with other contemporary merchants increasingly spreading their cargoes amongst multiple vessels in 
case the vessel was struck, captured, sunk or simply lost. Part of the beginnings of a financial 
revolution in the late seventeenth century, the rise of insurance companies investing in overseas 
trading voyages had become commonplace, which continued the trends of shared and widely spread 
cargoes which avoided great loss or risk.91 Indeed, when financial crises hit between the years of 1701 
DQGLWODUJHO\DIIHFWHGWKHQDWLRQ¶VSXEOLFILQDQFHQRWRYHUVHDVFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLW\GXHWRVXFK
preventative measures.92 Despite their political differences, the collaborative way in which STs and 
the RAC conducted their commerce was in fact in keeping with the habitual trading routines of the 
day. The fact, too, that these traders were based all over the British Isles as well as in the colonies 
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would suggest that London was not the only port to witness such collaboration.93 Of course, it was the 
case that the Company retained a history of taking legal action against its own agents in the 1680s 
ZKRPZHUHDFFXVHGRIHQJDJLQJLQSULYDWHWUDGHZLWKVHSDUDWHWUDGHUV0DQ\FRPSODLQHGWKDW³6RPH
of the factors on the Coast [of West $IULFD@NHHSWKHEHVWRIWKH1HJURHVWRVHOOWRWKH,QWHUORSHUV´94 
Yet this was clearly not unusual for Company merchants by the 1690s and 1700s as the Outgoings 
illustrates, and in these years much of the limited recorded umbrage the RAC took with Company 
collaborators were with those such as Dalby Thomas, a former interloper himself and one of the few 
to publicly profess his doing so.95 Regardless of this, the collaboration was hardly a covert operation 
unknown to the Company, given not only its scale in London docks, but also the likes of Davenant 
SUHVLGLQJRYHU WKH&RPSDQ\¶V UHFRUG-keeping such as these very Outgoings records.96 Political and 
diplomatic differences clearly failed to stop the Royal African Company from covert cooperation with 
other nations¶ PRQRSRO\ FRPSDQLHV HLWKHU $JUHHPHQWV ZHUH PDGH ZLWK WKH 'XWFK :HVW ,QGLD
Company and the French Guinea Company in 1704, with an expressed desire on the behalf of all three 
companies to suppress the common enemy of the English interloping merchant.97 This went against 
PXFKRIWKH5$&¶VUKHWRULFVXUURXQGLQJWKHQHFHVVLW\RIDQ(QJOLVKjoint-stock to counter those of the 
'XWFK DQG )UHQFK ZKRP ZHUH ³XQGHUPLQLQJ 3HRSOH´ DQG ZRXOG ³LQ D VKRUW 7LPH KDYH WKH HQWLUH
&RPPDQGRIWKH&RDVW´LIWKH5$&ZHUHWRQRWH[ist.98 Nor was the Company averse to dealings with 
Dutch interlopers on the coast ± themselves not legally allowed to trade as the English separate traders 
were ± whom were interloping not only against the Dutch West India Company but also the dominant 
EnglLVKVHSDUDWHWUDGHUVLQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VH\HVDQGZHUH³ZHOOSDLGIRUWKHLUSDLQV´DFFRUGLQJWRRQH
pamphleteer.99  
Of those separate traders whom were not politically active, there also existed a varied 
consistency of those whom collaborated with the RAC and those who chose not to. Thomas 
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Coalhurst, Jonathan Travers, Jeffrey Jeffreys and Robert Diamond were among those whom did not 
collaborate with the RAC. Indeed, given their recorded seven or eight consignment each years in other 
such documents, and only one or two each registered in the Company Outgoings, it was clear too that 
many did not register their cargo at all. 100  Other non-political traders however, such as Daniel 
Jamineau, Anthony Toruney, Sir William Benson and James Berdoe, all collaborated repeatedly with 
the Royal African Company. Of the 29 recorded voyages containing goods owned by Benson, 1702-
1710, more than 20% were in active partnership with the RAC, of which half of those were Benson 
shipping Company goods on their behalf. Daniel Jamineau was more prolific still, and of the 82 
individual voyages containing goods of his to West Africa, over 30% were alongside RAC cargoes, 
making him the most repeatedly cooperative merchant for the Company over the entire period of the 
Act to Settle the Trade to $IULFD¶V HQIRUFHPHQW -1712. Further to the collaborative nature of 
overseas trade at the turn of the eighteenth century, once Company commercial activities had ceased 
by 1710, Jamineau increased his shared voyages with other separate traders instead; Benjamin Way, 
John Lee, Isaac Milner and Thomas Coalhurst among others.  
Unsurprisingly, many of the voyages undertaken by political separate traders did not contain 
shared cargoes with the RAC.101 Indeed, separate traders with the highest frequencies of political 
actions against the Company - Richard Harris, Humphrey Morice, Isaac Milner and Robert Heysham -  
were also some of the most commercially active individuals, and yet were still recorded sharing no 
vessels with the Company. Isolated incidents did occur, however. In April 1704, Peregrine Browne, 
whom took three separate political actions against the Company, shipped tobacco aboard Swallow 
Brigantine alongside a wide array of Company cargoes. Significantly, these shipments were almost 
exclusively non-commercial goods, intended to resupply and restock settlements on the West African 
FRDVW ³*XQQHUV VWRUHVVROGLHUV¶ FORWKHVERRNVKHDY\ JXQV JXQ PRXQWV´ DQG RWKHU VXFK
commodities included illustrates clearly that although politically opposite and antagonistic, the 
practicalities of trade meant the Company was able to cooperate with even politically active separate 
traders on occasion. Similarly, Abraham Houlditch had taken six separate political actions against the 
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Company, yet this did not stop him from repeatedly trading alongside those whom were frequent 
collaborators with the RAC, such as Daniel Jamineau, for five of the 10 consignment years recorded, 
1702-12. The cargoes of Robert Heysham and Richard Harris repeatedly shared vessels with Daniel 
Jamineau too, despite their 13 and 28 respective political actions taken. The same was true for 
Humphrey Morice, with 22 separate actions against the Company.102 Other separate traders were not 
only non-political, but were former-Company traders and maintained their connections with the RAC 
as separate traders. Alexander Cleeve, a former Company agent in Gambia, remained crucial to the 
lifeline of the fortifications and settlements of the RAC once voyages had ceased to be undertaken by 
the Company post-1710.103 In August 1710 and October and November 1711, three separate voyages 
ZHUHXQGHUWDNHQZLWKWKHFRQVLJQPHQWRI&OHHYHFOHDUO\GHVWLQHGWRUHVWRFNWKH&RPSDQ\¶VIDFWRULHV
on the West African coast. Not only were there munitions present; demi-culverins, 100 muskets, 
1,656 rounds of musket shot, pistol ammunition and 100 barrels of gunpowder, but Cleeve was also 
shipping great volumes of foodstuffs such as bread, beef, cheese, pork, grain, beans, biscuit and 
YLQHJDU (YHQ WKH ³VXUJHRQ¶V LQVWUXPHQWV PHGLFLQes,...chandlerwares,...brassierwares,... 
VWDWLRQDU\ZDUHJULQGVWRQHV´DQGIODJVZHUHEHLQJVXSSOLHGE\&OHHYH 
The management and conduct of Anglo-African trade was not a straightforward struggle 
between separate trader and Royal African Company. It would be wildly inaccurate to suggest that 
separate traders existed as a homogenous group; Pettigrew has covered much ground on the 
differences between political and non-political separate traders at the turn of the century. Yet it would 
be inaccurate still to simply conclude the argument there. Evidently, the actions of the separate traders 
in the Anglo-African trade was not in the least as homogenous as the majority of their political 
campaigning had been in the 1690s and early 1700s. A sustained interest to achieve parliamentary 
victory was one thing; however the individuality of the separate traders is most clearly illustrated 
through their commercial conduct in London and West Africa. Here, the relationships were far more 
complex and far less rigidly aligned to their professed political ideology.104  The pamphlet debates 
                                                          
102
 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW p.78. 
103
 Nigel Tattersfield; The Forgotten Trade: Comprising the Log of the Daniel and Henry of 1700 and the Accounts of the 
Slave Trade from the Minor Ports of England, 1698-1725 (London, 1991) p.310. 
104
 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW p.50. 
46 
 
askew the true nature of the Anglo-African trade, given their role as propaganda to the populace of 
London and the outlying regions of England. Separate traders depicting not just the RAC but 
chartered monopoly companies more generally as part of the broader ideological argument of an 
µRSHQ¶WUDGH105 A part of this widening ideological debate only led further to the Anglo-African trade 
being affected by increasingly global interests at home as well as abroad. The African trading debates 
were, after all, one of the first large-scale public debates due in part to the lapse of government 
censorship, the increase of printing, and the widespread interests nationally in the Anglo-African 
trade.106 ,QGHHGZKHUHRQHVHSDUDWHWUDGHUZULWHV³7KH\KDYHEHHQSHUVHFXWHGDQGWRUPHQWHGZLWKDOO
9LROHQFHDQG&UXHOW\´DQG³0DQ\ KDYHEHHQUREE¶GRIWKHLU6KLSVDQG*RRGV´E\ WKH5$&LWZDV
quite clear that collaboration was not an impossibility, far from it.107 The very fact that Company 
agents frequently discouraged West Africans from dealings with the separate traders did not mean 
they themselves were averse to such interactions. 108  Even Thomas Phillips was open about 
commodities aboard his voyage of the Hannibal, 1694, which were the private trade of his and his 
DVVRFLDWHVDQGRWKHUVZKLFKZHUHRIWKH$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\¶VRZQHUVKLSdeclaring that it was those of 
the Company that failed to sell well, and not his own.109 Company agents such as Dalby Thomas were 
not alone, nor even the first by a decade, to have cooperated with private interests against the 
Company.  
This is a symptom of the trading debates in general, with its perceived outcome just as 
flawed. The separate traders were not all successful; many failed in their ventures, and many made 
significant losses.110 Yet the accomplishments of the separate traders collectively were to out-price 
and outmanoeuvre the RAC on the West African coast, in the cases of some individuals without the 
expressed intention of doing so. This was, in many regards however, reason for the representation of 
the two antithetical positions of the Anglo-African trade thus far. With the bankruptcy of the 
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&RPSDQ\ DQLPRVLW\ FRQWLQXHG WR SHUYDGH SXEOLFDWLRQV ³6LQFH WKH ([SLUDWLRQ RI WKDW $FW´ RQH
PHUFKDQWZURWH³ZKLFKZDVLQWKH\HDUDOORWKHUVKLV0DMHVW\¶V6XEMHFWVKDYHWUDGHGIUHHO\WR
Africa, without contributing anything to the said charge; and the Company have born and defrayed the 
Whole of that Expence; and by this means the separate Traders have reaped the whole profit of this 
7UDGH´111  Davenant surmised it well; ³:KHQHYHU WKH >VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV@ should come to find their 
profit not answerable to their expectation, they would quickly draw their necks out of the collar, and 
JLYH RYHU WKH WUDGH E\ GHJUHHV´ ,W ZDV HYHQ QRWHG E\ )UHQFK PHUFKDQWV WKDW WKH (QJOLVK VHSDUDWH
traders were causing steep price rises of enslaved Africans.112 $V WKH VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV µRXW-ELG¶ WKH
Company, it was perceived that the Company simply lost.113 These words of Davenant, written on the 
FXVSRIWKH5$&¶VEDQNUXSWF\LQKDYHFRPHWRVKDSHWKHZD\WKHWUDGHKDVEHHQH[DPLned ever 
since, yet the Outgoings and Incomings kept by the RAC fundamentally highlight the strengths, rather 
WKDQ WKH ZHDNQHVVHV RI WKH &RPSDQ\ 7KH EDQNUXSWF\ DQG DSSDUHQW GHPLVH RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
commercial activity subsequent to 1710, coupled with the expiry of the 1698 Act in 1712 appears in 
the eyes of many to only solidify what began in 1698 ± the inevitable demise of the RAC. 114 
&RQVLGHULQJQRWRQO\WKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWV¶SROLWLFDODQLPRVLW\WRZDUGVFKDUWHUHGFRPSDQLHVDWWKH
dawn of the eighteenth century, but that of individual traders too, should have made it almost 
impossible for the Company to secure its monopoly and carry on its trade.  
Indeed, investors abandoned the company, and only a year after the expiration of the Ten 
Percent Act. In June WKHVWRFNZDVSWKHORZHVWLWKDGVXQNWRVLQFHWKH&RPSDQ\¶VLQFHSWLRQ
in the 1670s.115 Market capital had shrunk to £21,500.116 Historians have seen the 1698 Act as the 
beginning of a perpetual decline in the Company, but its expiry is moreover important. Whilst the 
RAC was clearly being outmanoeuvred both in the English ports and on the West African coast 
regarding both the volume and quality of its trade, investors maintained trust in the Company whilst 
its monopoly existed. In this regard, the fundamental success of the Company through these years was 
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to be able to continue its commercial activities whilst the cards were heavily stacked against its 
favour. This was the case in 1698, with the widespread enmity towards monopoly companies in 
general ± particularly those with such strong historical connections to the Restoration monarchs. 
Ultimately, the ability of the Company to undertake joint ventures with almost 50 separate traders as 
its financial situation continued to nosedive ± some of whom being its harshest political critics - was a 
remarkable success of the RAC. The Outgoings record kept by the Company, 1702-1712, provide a 
clear illustration not only of the willingness of separate traders to support the Royal African Company 
commercially, but to provide factory goods to maintain its forts and settlements which provided the 
framework of the RAC on the West African coast. This level of support was unprecedented by 
merchants, of whom some fundamentally disagreed with the very existence of forts and factories on 
WKH:HVW$IULFDQFRDVWDQGZKRPFRQWLQXHGWREHOLHYHWKHPWREHQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQWKH³PLVFKLHIV
RI0RQRSRO\´DQGDKXJHZDVWHRIPRQH\117 +DUVKZRUGVWKH\PD\KDYHEHHQEXWJLYHQWKHDXWKRU¶V
anonymity, there is now little to suggest they could not have been penned by a separate trader whom 




In the formative years of the eighteenth century, the Anglo-African trade had developed into a wholly 
globalised commercial venture for British merchants. A booming re-export market and growing 
overseas experiences in the Americas, the East Indies and Europe was able to fuel the increasingly 
global demands of West African merchants. 7UDGLWLRQDO KLVWRULRJUDSK\ DOOXGHV WR µJOREDO
PDUNHWSODFHV¶QRWGHYHORSLQJH[WHUQDOWR(XURSHXQWLOWKHODWHUeighteenth century, and yet the cargoes 
transported to West Africa in the Outgoings heavily suggests otherwise.118 The impact of overseas 
markets on domestic English political affairs and manufacturing industries had beginnings in the late 
seventeenth century, and specifically regarding West African marketplaces. Discussing the markets in 
their globalised characteristics helps to deconstruct the artificial bifurcation of what has developed 
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into two dominant theatres of historical assessment; East and West.119 Presenting instead the way in 
which markets were interconnected by their increasingly globally-sourced commodities exchanged 
there, and the effects these commercial networks had on domestic political administration, more 
accurately depicts the markets as a whole. Historiographical trends have circumvented either giving 
WKHDUJXPHQWVRIµJOREDOWUDGH¶DSXUHO\$WOantic lens and scope (largely excluding West Africa), or 
taking individual marketplaces as examples of globalised commerce without considering the domestic 
implications until the later eighteenth century.120 Many, such as Hopkins, state the beginnings of a 
µJOREDOLVHG¶ZRUOGWKURXJKFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQdid not really begin until the 1760s.121 It was with 
a distinctly West African sentiment that the seeds of global trade were sewn however, with enslaved 
Africans as labour, capital and currency shaping integration, dictated by Europeans, for over four 
hundred years with the escalation of Anglo-African trading after 1698 being vital to such global 
LQWHUDFWLRQ:KHQ-DFRE3ULFHLQVLVWVZHPXVWEH³LPSUHVVHGE\WKHLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHSDUWV´RI
global trade ± the East Indies, Central Asia, West Africa, East and Western Europe, the British Isles, 
North and South America ± there is nowhere more impressive in its scope nor chronology than the 
West African coast.122 ExamSOHV RI KLV µLPSHULDO HFRQRP\¶ SUH-GDWHG LWV IXOO IRUP RI ³D FRPSOH[
PXOWLODWHUDO WUDGLQJ V\VWHP´ RI WKH V E\ RYHU  \HDUV 123  As well as fuelling commodity 
production in the American colonies however, the West African marketplaces became the central hub 
of global commodity exchange long before 1750s and 1760s so commonly purported to be the origins 
of globalised interaction.  
Price summarised the typical, simple selection of goods commonly traded to West Africa, 
stating ³6ODYHV ZHUH ERXJKW LQ $IULFD ZLth Asian textiles as well as Birmingham guns and Italian 
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EHDGV´124  TKH&RPSDQ\¶VOutgoings show that this principle of domestic, American, European and 
East Indian goods were indeed amongst the most popular in West Africa. Widely ranging selections 
of commodities became commonly exchanged, driven in part by the differing interests of British 
merchants, with a further post-1698 boom in bilateral trade between the southern ports of England and 
the coast of West Africa. Giving momentum to other scholars¶ works in the globalising overseas 
markets, outside of North-West Europe, the RAC Outgoings firmly place West Africa as much a part 
RI D µJOREDO¶ WUDGH DV LW ZDV RI DQ µ$WODQWLF¶ RQH 125  Whereby Marion Johnson and others have 
illustrated the volume and value of goods being transported globally to the coast of Africa, these 
documents place an even wider array of goods within their set voyages. This allows for a rudimentary 
cross-examination of the Outgoings and Incomings with data elsewhere on these very same voyages 
to assert how valuable to the African merchant, not just London, these commodities were.126  It 
illustrates, too, how increasingly frequently these global goods were being combined and bundled 
together on single voyages. Combined with this, the existence of strong bilateral trading links between 
England and the West African coast were certainly prominent enough to witness most goods (other 
than Ivory) to be imported from Africa directly. These goods in many cases avoided the famed 
triangular trade.127 Although incomplete, the RAC documents give clear indication of the scale of this, 
and provide the springboard to this inquiry. Having been largely left out of historiographical 
assessments since, the focus of which has usually been on the trade in enslaved Africans, the bilateral 
trade had implications for numerous domestic English industries, chiefly that of textile manufacturing. 
Works have been published which, although outlining the general trend of the dominant goods 
shipped to West Africa, fail to give GHHSHUDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHFRPPRGLWLHV¶JOREDORULJLQVnor do they 
trace the beginnings of their global influences. Whilst the English textile market found a home in 
West Africa, Virginian tobacco, Jamaican rum, handfuls of East Indian textiles and German linens 
were known to have been shipped there since the earlier seventeenth century. Yet it was only after the 
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mass commercialisation of Anglo-African trade began in 1698, that West Africa could truly be 
defined as a global marketplace.128 The 1698 Act catalysed the dramatic increase in the volume of 
goods shipped to West Africa, and the number of English merchants engaging in the Anglo-African 
trade accordingly.129 The basket of these goods, too, became progressively cosmopolitan in nature, 
and with far more globally sourced origins than previously, the markets of the West African coast 
were globalised like no other extra-European commercial theatre. East Indian textiles were of prime 
significance. Indeed, forbidden from being imported to Britain by the Calico Acts, linens, cottons and 
calicoes from all over the subcontinent quickly found a home redirected to West Africa. Materials 
barred from London were frequently traded along the Gold Coast, the Slave Coast, and the Bight of 
Benin. Political activity in Britain thus placed the textiles of the Indian Subcontinent at the forefront 
of the commercial debate, with West Africa as the natural recipient of the Eastern textiles.  
As Figures 5 and 6 show below, increasingly over the first decade of the eighteenth century 
the trade to Africa witnessed substantial growth in the proportion of East Indian as well as European 
textiles being shipped to the West African coast. In just four years from 1702 to 1706, the proportion 
of East Indian goods amongst Anglo-African trading vessels rose from 61% to 97%, predominated by 
textiles, cottons and linens from across the subcontinent. This was part of a much larger commercial 
trend, as after 1698 East Indian textiles quickly rose to become the largest trading commodity to the 
West African coast.130 Strikingly, there was no single dominant cloth of the East Indies amongst 
commercial voyages to West Africa; however those individual fabrics produced on the western coast 
of the Indian subcontinent were traded in greater numbers than any other. The varied African 
marketplaces along its coast made the introduction of these commodities at the beginning of the 
eighteenth-century very welcome. 131  The preference of certain East Indian textiles among African 
markets has been developed in other literature by those such as Colleen Kriger, and until the end of 
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Africa. Crucially this varied from region to region, port to port. By the mid-eighteenth century, it was 
clear that baftas were popular on the Senegal basin, brawles, tapseils and nicanees were favoured on 
the Gold Coast, and muslins, calicoes, chints and pintadoes were sold almost exclusively in the Bight 
of Benin as trading patterns and records of the Cottons such as allejars and long cloth were sold all 
along the coast. This variation was key, and evidence below from the Outgoings illustrates the growth 
in the presence of these goods immediately after 1698. Propelled by the political action at home, East 
Indian textile re-exports by the 1720s were the dominant make-up of British shipping to West Africa. 
Yet even as early as 1705, whole shipments of goods were turned away by uninterested African 
merchants for being of inferior quality, or traded at a steep loss. On numerous occasions commodities 
would be turnHGDZD\DQGGHHPHG³QRW9HQGLEOH´IRUQRWEHLQJRI(DVW,QGLDQRULJLQ132 West African 
merchants were wise to English attempts at passing off cheap English and Welsh productions as high-
quality Indian fabrics.133 Outgoings clearly highlight the increased proportion of these goods in the 
formative years of the 1700s, and since the mid-seventeenth-century, East Indian textiles being 
shipped to the West African coast were multiplied by the 1698 Act capitalising on the increasing 
desire of separate traders to engage in the Anglo-African trade. While some British manufacturers 
began to mimic the designs of East Indian fabrics after their importation ban, these were not a 
considerable export to West Africa until the mid-eighteenth century.134  
Among the Outgoings the most prominent and recurring textiles of the East Indies amongst 
Anglo-African cargoes were nicanees, brawles, tapseils, chints of all designs, and calicoes. Regarding 
the East India trade, the textile markets of Bombay and Surat crept ahead of other manufacturers on 
the subcontinent due to their proximity to English ports in the East Indies, and moreover the fact that 
these were the goods most imported by the English East India Company to domestic British ports.135 
By extension, the wider areas of textile manufacturing in Gujarat, and down the western coast of the 
                                                          
132
 7'DOE\7KRPDVWR5$&&DSH&RDVW&DVWOH³6FKHPHRI*RRGV:DQWHGDQG$EVWUDFWVRI/HWWHUVfrom the Coast 
RI$IULFD´th March, 1706.  
133
 Simon Newman; A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic (Philadelphia, 
2013) pp.40-41 
134
 Kriger; µ*XLQHD&ORWK¶pp.121-123  
135
 A Collection of Voyages and Travels, some Now first Printed from Original Manuscripts (London, 1782) p.206. 
53 
 
subcontinent into Konkan and Malabar, held great significance in the profitability of the Anglo-
African trade. This was clear, as between 1702 and 1712, the AfricDQ&RPSDQ\¶VOutgoings recorded 
nicanees, cheap and lightweight textiles produced along the west coast of India, aboard 129 separate 
voyages.136 Similarly, tapseils, popular white and blue striped fabrics from the same areas, were 
recorded aboard 114 separate voyages to Africa.137 Brawles too were noted by the Company agents in 
no fewer than 114 individual voyages. These predominant commodities were accompanied by many 
other goods, namely, bejutapauts, byrampauts, cheiloes, guinea graines, guinea stuffs, Gujarat chints, 
Gujarat cloth, pallampores, sawes and other such stuffs all originating from Gujarat, Konkan and 
Malabar.138 A widening of the British interactions in the East Indies was doubtless contributing to the 
surge in the East Indian commodity trade to West Africa, along with the enforcement of the Calico 
Act, 1699, which permitted East Indian textiles only for re-exportation. These circumstances, 
combined with the influx of independent merchants now commercially active in the Anglo-African 
trade, were considerable factors in the rise of the East Indian goods transacted, seen below.  
In short, the difference in Anglo-African commercial activity post-1698 is significant. The 
trade conducted solely by Company trading in the late 1690s, as recorded by Davies, saw the total 
volume of goods in the trade multiply only a few years after 1698. The total value of the Anglo-
African iron trade was recorded to have increased from £3,354 in 1698 to £5,156 in 1704. For copper, 
the growth was from £100 in 1698 to £652 in 1701. Perpetuanos saw a near-50% increase from 
£10,364 in 1698 to £14,387 in 1704. Despite this, East Indian textile trade has heretofore been 
recorded as largely floundering after 1698.139 'DYLHV¶ DVVHVVPHQWV IURP 7 -920, ultimately 
JLYH XQUHOLDEOH UHFRUGLQJV DV WKH\ IDLO WR LQFOXGH WKH 'DWD IURP WKH &RPSDQ\¶V Outgoings, which 
highlight the Company voyages containing East Indian cargoes in 1702 alone were valued at over 
£13,370. In 1704, this figure was over £35,000 and, although independent commodity values remain 
difficult, it was clear that the mere £162 of nicanees, and lack of any recordings of tapseils at all 
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presented in Davies¶ZRUN were not giving a rounded illustration of the trade. Further to this, declines 
in overall trading figures in these formative years of the eighteenth century were due in part to the 
War of Spanish Succession, beginning for Britain in 1702, which saw heavy losses to shipping that 
did not subside until 1708. Records for Davies ceasing in 1704, the T 70/1199 document continues 
XQWLO  SUHVHQWLQJ DQ RYHUDUFKLQJ WUHQG RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V FRPPHUFLDO GHFOLQH QRW shown by 
Davies. The Outgoings highlight a significantly ZLGHUDUUD\RIFRPPRGLWLHVZLWK'DYLHV¶GDWDOLVWLQJ
RQO\HLJKWVHSDUDWH(DVW,QGLDQWH[WLOHVDQGWKUHH(QJOLVK2YHUDOOVWXG\LQJRQO\'DYLHV¶ILJXUHVRI
Anglo-African commercial interaction provides a narrow perspective on the trade, simplifying the 





















(Fig. 6 ± Continued, 1707-1712.) 
 Dominant though it may have become amongst English merchandise shipped to Africa, the 
products of the west coast of India travelled alongside numerous goods from other regions of Asia. 
Indeed, calicoes were the most commonly shipped commodity of the East Indies, noted amongst 140 
individual voyages to West Africa. Although a general term for textiles originating in the East Indies, 
numerous cargo loads of calicoes did contain annotated regional discrepancies, with calicoes not only 
from the west coast, but from the east. Alongside these came more specific textiles, such as allibanes, 
charridaries, cherconnaes, gurrah, handkerchiefs, nillaes, sannoes, sooseys and the more rare taffetas 
from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Expensive throne silk was shipped by both the RAC and separate 
traders on three individual occasions; twice in 1702, and in late 1707. From the Coromandel Coast, 
there came to Africa diapers, dimities, long cloth, photaes, romalles, and sallampores. This stretched 
further, whereby outside of the Indian subcontinent witnessed goods imported to West Africa. Two 
VHSDUDWHWUDGLQJYR\DJHVLQZHUHUHFRUGHGVKLSSLQJµ)ORZHUHG&KLQD7DIIHWDV¶WR:HVW$IULFD
likely from the port of Canton, as well as threaded satin and china alongside similar cargoes.140  
Surpassing these were the records of chints which were shipped en masse to West Africa, not 
only from Gujarat, Coromandel or Bengal, but further inland of the Mughal Empire in Patna too, as 
well as Portuguese Goa. French chints were also shipped by the RAC on two separate occasions in 
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1704 and 1705, likely from the central commercial port of the French East India Company at 
Pondicherry.141 Persian chints became a feature not uncommonly witnessed in the Anglo-African 
trade in these years of the early eighteenth century too, with 1704, 1705 and 1710 all featuring 
voyages containing the goods. Similarly, multan chints, from south-west Asia, were also shipped in 
1707.142 Outside of the textile trade were East Indian cowries and rangoes - shells usually from the 
Maldive islands of the Indian Ocean.143 These were, particularly along the Slave Coast, noted by 
(XURSHDQVDVEHLQJXVHGIRUFXUUHQF\ZLWK7KRPDV3KLOOLSV UHPDUNLQJ WKDW WKH\FRXOGEHXVHG³WR
EX\DQ\WKLQJ´144 Indeed, this was the case recognised by Anglo-African merchants by the end of the 
seventeenth century, with cowries appearing as the most popular East Indian good traded to Africa 
after calicoes, as noted in the Outgoings document, loaded onto approximately 130 voyages. 
Similarly, rangoes were loaded onto approximately 90 voyages, with both shells along with other 
µERXJHV¶ EHLQJ LQXVH ZLWKLQ WKH :HVW $IULFDQ HFRQRPLHV VLQFH WKH PLG-sixteenth century.145 Other 
Eastern goods were to be found in transit to Africa, including alloes and ticks, types of East Indian 
wood, and goods traded with the Dutch East Indies such as coffee, nutmeg and pepper, suggesting that 
cross-company trading between Europeans in extra-European markets was not uncommon. Indeed, 
separate traders would often illegally dock in ports of the Netherlands before setting sail to West 
Africa in order to attain an even wider stock of goods than other English merchants by ignoring the 
Navigation Acts.146 Contrary to this, tea and spices, staples of British East Indian trade by around 
1713, both struggled to find a commercial foothold in Africa at least in these formative years of the 
1700s, with tea loaded onto only seven separate cargoes, 1705-1710, by separate traders.147 Similarly, 
East Indian spices had only exclusive interest among non-commercial voyages of the RAC, with the 
intention of cultivation rather than consumption or trade.148 Recorded on six separate occasions, 1702-
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for the attention of the European factors in Africa, not the African merchants.  
Vast increases in the prevalence of East Indian goods were driven by their heightened demand 
on the West African coast. ,QPDQ\FDVHV:HVW$IULFDQPHUFKDQWV¶GHVLUHVEHFDPHIDUPRUHGLIILFXOW
to satiate as the European interactions with the coast multiplied. The 1698 Act boosted the Anglo-
African trade, and this in turn produced an overwhelming sense of a µEX\HUV¶PDUNHW¶LQ:HVW$IULFD
± merchants would accept only the finest quality of goods from Europeans. It was certainly, as Ty M 
5HHVH VWDWHV D ³:HVW $IULFDQ-GLFWDWHG V\VWHP´149 Cheap imports were often only accepted if they 
were bundled with the most expensive East Indian goods, and European and English woollens, 
cottons and linens increasingly needed to be exported in bundles with East Indian textiles in order to 
PD[LPLVH :HVW $IULFDQV¶ LQWHUHVW150  East Indian textiles were, for many traders, the key to their 
success on the coast, and to this growth in commercial activity. When shipments were well received 
however, they were met with a huge potential customer base for European traders, with the 
commodities permeating through all members of society from the West African elites down to even 
the indentured servants of West Africa. It was a system, however, which was almost totally proscribed 
by the West African merchants and their desire for an expansive range of high-quality imports.151 The 
ingredients for a globalised trade in West Africa were all present, and this quickly became the case in 
the early eighteenth-century: a clear, open door to textiles shipped to West Africa, a burgeoning 
Anglo-African commerce due to the 1698 Act, and an increase in the volume of East Indian goods 
being traded by English merchants which could no longer be imported to the domestic English 
markets. This led to East Indian textiles being the single largest and dominant import to West African 
by Europeans as early as 1720.152 
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 Witnessed amongst these exports and re-exports as well is the ownership of the cargoes 
aboard each voyage. Unsurprisingly, the separate traders, with the greatest volume of merchandise 
throughout the recorded period, consistently shipped the greatest volume of goods from around the 
globe. It was not simply the case in the earlier years of the recorded Outgoings that the separate 
traders exported increasing percentages of East Indian goods year on year. Fluctuations existed 
between independent merchants, the RAC and shared cargoes which were telling of the strength of the 
Company in these earlier years, not just in relation to East Indian trade, but European re-exports too 
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(Figs. 7-11 ± The ownership of cargoes aboard the voyages, and the percentage of goods and their 
origins contained therein, 1702-4, 1706, and 1708.) 
 European re-exports were found with consistently higher frequency in the Outgoings from 
1702; however this was largely due to the dominance of iron sourced from Sweden and its 
surrounding Baltic empires which was always in great demand.153 Voyages containing iron numbered 
RXWRIWKHWRWDOUHFRUGHGLQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VOutgoings (81%), making it by far the single most 
commonplace commodity traded with in West Africa by Europeans in the formative years of the 
eighteenth century.154 Indeed, iron was essential to West African markets, acting alongside cowries 
and rangoes as a benchmark currency which other commodities were measured against, including 
enslaved Africans.155 Textile manufacturing on the European continent grew significantly over the 
second half of the eighteenth century, leading to increased imports of particularly German linens 
which were re-exported in large quantities to West Africa. Indeed, 138 voyages contained German 
linens, narrow and broad, over the years recorded in the Outgoings, with a growing geographic spread 
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RI WKH JRRGV¶RULJLQV +HVVHQFDQYDV156, sletias and lawns from Silesia and ozenbrigs from Bavaria 
were all popular amongst certain demographics in West Africa, with approximately 25 voyages 
collectively containing these goods from wider Germany.157 7KH8QLWHG3URYLQFHV¶WH[WLOHLQGXVWU\DV
well as influencing English manufacturing in the seventeenth century, was itself exchanged frequently 
by British merchants on the West African coast. Amongst 17 individual voyages between 1702 and 
 WKHUH FRQWDLQHG ODUJH VKLSPHQWV RI µ+ROODQG OLQHQ¶ QDUURZ DQG EURDG 6WUDLQHG GLSORPDWLF
relations and even warfare failed to sever commercial connections between the French and Spanish 
goods frequently seen in the Anglo-African trade. Between 1705 and 1710, various voyages were 
undertaken containing significant measurements of Spanish cloth, with Spanish snuff also included in 
one voyage in June 1706. Not only were French chints features of the Anglo-African smorgasbord of 
merchandise, but so too were linens manufactured in Brittany carried on separate trader voyages 
recorded in 1709. Continental European textile industries, particularly in central and northern Europe, 
were essential to the Anglo-African trade particularly after the boom in commercial activity post-
1698. Not only were the domestic British textiles receiving great interest in the booming export 
market of West Africa, but merchants were quick to re-export European linens to satiate demand too. 
Even supplies considered more essential were not simply supplied domestically, with shipments of 
Westphalia bacon, cooking oil from Genoa, claret and brandy ± µ$TXDYLWDH¶± from various French 
regions, Holland duck, Lubeck duck, Portuguese port and wine from Spain, Madeira, Italy and 
)UDQFHDVZHOODVµVWURQJZDWHUV¶DQGEHHUIURPFRQWLQHQWDO(XURSH,QWHUHVWLQJO\WRROLVWHGDPRQJVW
non-commercial Company cargoes to West Africa were other Dutch goods, specifically quils, ink-
KROGHUV µORRNLQJ JODVVHV¶ DQG YDULRXV PHULGLDQ DQG VHD FRPpasses not present from other 
destinations. As such, there was a strong chance that the Company, despite its patriotic sentiments, 
was dependent on its chief rival in West Africa for such basic essentials in its settlements.158  
From across the Atlantic, there were large shipments of goods cultivated and produced in the 
Americas as well. Similar to the Europeans of the seventeenth century, West Africans also 
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experienced something of an insatiable appetite for tobacco, which only grew after the turn of the 
eighteenth century. Senegambia particularly, as well as further inland, took to cultivation of the plant 
after its initial imports to the coast in the early seventeenth century, which managed to hold its own 
against European imports until the 1780s.159 Nevertheless, further east along, demand in the Gold and 
Slave Coast regions was significant enough to warrant mass-importation of tobacco and tobacco 
SLSHVZLWQHVVHGLQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VOutgoings. Indeed, no fewer than 240 voyages contained Tobacco, 
the second most VKLSSHGFRPPRGLW\LQWKH$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\¶VOutgoings after iron. Virginia tobacco 
was kept exclusive, usually distinguished for its geographical source of cultivation by the company 
agents as well as the Africans, but more commonly shipped was tobacco from the Caribbean islands. 
Alongside these, felt and castor hats fashioned from rabbit, beaver or deer from land settled by the 
+XGVRQ¶V %D\ &RPSDQ\ DURXQG 5XSHUW¶V /DQG LQ QRUWKHUQ $PHULFD ZHUH FRPPRQO\ WUDGHG
Muscovado sugars from the Caribbean was not uncommonly found, nor were spirits brewed in the 
Americas with the aid of molasses, shipped frequently in 1702, 1704 and 1710. Goods produced in the 
North America and the Caribbean were not, bar tobacco, felt and castor, not of the highest demand 
across some parts of West Africa, yet its significance as a destination for African-produced goods 
such as ivory, beeswax and redwood was more important to Anglo-African commerce still. 
Very little scholarly work exists on the study of redwood importation from Africa, to either 
England or the Americas, however it was certainly the former which dominated demand. Very much a 
staple of the Anglo-African trade, it in many ways was more significant to English markets than even 
ivory was at the turn of the eighteenth century. Given the prevalence of the Gloucestershire and 
Devon trades through the port of Bristol at this time too, the focus on redwood has been 
disproportionately placed in such regions. 160  This becomes more evident when assessing the 
Incomings as noted by the Royal African Company, determining that those merchants embarking on 
WKHLUUHWXUQYR\DJHIURP$IULFDGLUHFWO\QRWHQJDJLQJLQWKHµWULDQJXODU¶WUDGHRIWKH$WODQWLFWUDGHG
nearly tenfold the value of redwood than their counterparts whom sailed to the Americas. Over the 
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twelve year period, 1699-1711, those returning directly from West Africa traded in over 2,100 tons of 
UHGZRRG FRPSDUHG WR WKH  E\ µWULDQJXODU¶ PHUFKDQWV 7KLV ELODWHUDO $QJOR-African trade was 
clearly substantial in volume, representing DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI YR\DJHV UHFRUGHG LQ WKH 5$&¶V
Incomings book.  
,QGHHG DOWKRXJK DW QR SRLQW LV LW GLUHFWO\ UHIHUHQFHG 0DULRQ -RKQVRQ¶V YROXPH RI GDWD
VLJQLILHV WKH FRQWUDVW EHWZHHQ µLPSRUWV¶ DQG µLQGLUHFW LPSRUWV¶ IURP $IULFD WKH ODWWHU EHLQJ WKRVH
brought via the middle passage across the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas. 161  The &RPSDQ\¶V
Incomings UHFRUGVLPLODUSDWWHUQVRIFRPPHUFHWRRZLWK-RKQVRQ¶VGDWDFRQVLVWHQWO\VKRZLQJLQGLUHFW
imports valued at only 20-30% of the overall share of total imports from West Africa between 1699 
DQG  'HVSLWH EHLQJ IURP D VHSDUDWH VHW RI UHFRUGV HQWLUHO\ &867  	 &867  -RKQVRQ¶V
dataset for 1699-1708 highlights just over 20% of the total goods brought to England were indirect 
imports, mirrored in the T 70/1198 records, measuring 19.3%.162 This was with the make-up of 
bilateral voyages occurring for just under a third of all returning from West Africa, as recorded by the 
5$&¶V Incomings. Hardly surprising that the bulk of commercial wealth coming from Africa came 
directly, it remains striking the proportion of Anglo-$IULFDQ WUDGH WKDWZDVQRW µWULDQJXODU¶ ,QGHHG
combining bilateral voyages with the wider Atlantic commercial activity by British merchants, as well 
as the non-commercial voyages to West Africa which made up approximately 15% of all recorded 
voyages in the Company Outgoings, the slave trade was not the only vessel of commerce, nor was it 
³WKH VSULQJ DQG SDUHQW IURP ZKHQFH RWKHU IORZ´ UHJDUGLQJ WKH ZLGHU $QJOR-African commerce.163 
Increasingly dominating as it was in Atlantic and global commerce, fuelling other dependant trades in 
the American plantations directly, hundreds of markets, manufacturers and merchants relied, by the 
turn of the eighteenth century, on the Anglo-African trade.  
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(Fig. 12 ± Tons of redwood traded per annum aboard vessels engaging in bilateral, and triangular 
Anglo-African commerce.) 
For many industries surrounding the textile trades of England, global influences on domestic 
markets were becoming especially true regarding West Africa. For decades now, historians have been 
aware that West Africans did not play a passive role in the slave trade.164 In not only supply of the 
slaves, but in varied patterns of consumption as well as wide variation of market demands, West 
African communities were an extremely active half of the Anglo-African slave trading commerce. If 
markets in West Africa were active in this way, however, there is argument to be made that African 
influences spread further, with greater degrees of influence over the development of English markets 
and manufacturing domestically. If differences in West African consumption patterns had significant 
repercussions for the English slave trading industry, this can be extended to the manufacturing 
markets in England, with livelihoods dependent on a booming Anglo-African trade.165 With regards to 
this, while the majority of voyages undertaken to West Africa were not bilateral, redwood was crucial 
to the dyeing communities of London and Gloucestershire.166 As is recognised in the section on the 
African trading debates, these polities held an undoubtedly powerful political lobby alongside other 
clothiers and textile workers both influencing and influenced by global markets both in the East Indies 
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and West Africa. Previous scholarly work which touches on the dyestuff provides links only to the 
%ULVWROWUDGHWR$IULFDDQGLWVLPSRUWDWLRQWRWKH:HVW&RXQWU\¶VEXUJHRQLQJ$WODQWLFFRPPHUFH167  
This was due in great part to the passing of the 1698 Act to Settle the Trade to Africa, 
allowing for the significant numbers of separate traders that operated from ports outside of London ± 
the main port of the Royal African Company ± to do so legally.168 Significantly, the 1698 act itself 
EHFDPHFHQWUDO WRPDQ\G\HUV¶FRQFHUQVZKLFKZHUH UDSLGO\EHLQJ WUansported overseas to not only 
West Africa, but to the East Indies, where manufacturing abroad was capable of ruining their 
livelihoods.169 Indeed, involved in these growing textile lobbies across England were many of the 
same demographics whom were as opposed to the ten percent levy on redwood dyes from Africa as 
they were to the importation of East Indian linen threatening to dominate their markets. In some cases, 
communities of dyers whom had been well furnished with trade to Africa by the RAC, becoming 
active in the national political debate on the side of the Company, were likely some of those voicing 
their animosity to the tax on redwood dye imports.170 As numerous traders to West Africa were 
disinterested with the slave trade and the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa being focused 
predominantly on those merchants of the triangular trade, this concern held its own legitimacy.171 
Much of the justification of lowering the tax on redwood dyes came from its sourcing predominantly 
in the Senegambia region, which at the turn of the eighteenth century received little attention from 
slave traders.172 Subsequently, pressure on both issues became strong enough to lower the levy on 
redwood to five percent, half of every other commodity taxed in the Anglo-African trade. A year later 
in 1699, it also pushed legislation enacting the ban on East Indian imported textiles, in turn fuelling 
the boom LQ(DVW,QGLDQPHUFKDQGLVHVHQWWR:HVW$IULFDLOOXVWUDWHGE\WKH5$&¶VOutgoings.173  
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China, or the East Indies; and all calicoes, painted, dyed, printed, or stained there, which are 
or shall be imported into this kingdom, shall not be worn or otherwise used in Great Britain, 
DQGDOOJRRGVLPSRUWHGDIWHUWKDWGD\VKDOOEHZDUHKRXVHGDQGH[SRUWHGDJDLQ´174  
From 1701 until 1712, recorded increases of East Indian textiles amongst voyages loaded onto Anglo-
African voyages occurred from 61% to 100%. It was at the very cusp of the eighteenth century that 
not only were there mass increases in the numbers of those trading to West Africa, but an increase in 
the goods in demand on the West African coast needing greater supply there.  
 This was met with further such political debates in the 1690s, significant in their global 
application. The legal proceedings of the East India Company in this era were to affect the RAC 
significantly. This was true of legislation which supported the Company, for example, in 1685; it was 
the ruling by Sir George Jeffreys in East India Company v. Sandys that the monarch had the right to 
charter joint stock companies, whom in turn had the right to protect them with cargo seizures.175 What 
was true for one legally was, by extension, true for another, yet both the constructs and constraints of 
the joint-stock ran further still. Alongside this ruling in East India Company v. Sandys, Jeffreys ruled 
RYHU WKH LPSDVVH RI WKH FURZQ¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG QDYDO FDSDFLW\ IDLOLQJ XOWLPDWHO\ WR FRYHU WKH
sprawling reaches of English commercial networks by the mid-1680s. Indeed, this was only further to 
the case a decade later, and would continue to be so as the commercial enterprises of the English and 
then British nation took merchants further east and west.176 -HIIUH\¶V UXOLQJRQ WKH(,&ZDV WKDWWKH
case favouring companies and societies was fundamentally due to the capital expenses in engaging in 
long-distance trades ± principle among these being  the maintenance of forts and factories, as well as 
establishing networked relationships with the local populations, used for aiding in self-sufficiency of 
the English colonial settlements.177 The English colonial experience in the East Indies may have 
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dwarfed that of the RAC regarding governing populations ± 0DGUDV¶WR&DSH&RDVW&DVWOH¶V
little more than 100 ± yet the imperial ideology behind this in India, the Americas and West Africa, 
was one and the same, dictated by political and commercial events in London, as well as the 
experiences of the English merchants and factors abroad.178 Indeed, the limited number of soldiers and 
agents on the African coast, combined with the lack of significant military engagements witnessed 
there has likely contributed to this scholarly oversight when comparing the East Indies, Europe and 
North America.179 When, some years later in 1696, Chief Justice John Holt confirmed in Dockwra v. 
Dickenson WKDWWKH5$&¶VVHL]XUHRIFDUJRHVOHJDOO\YRLG WKLVDOVRVHQWVLJQLILFDQWPHVVDJHVWR WKH
(DVW,QGLD&RPSDQ\WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRXWORRNRQMRLQW-stocks were globally focussed.180 A ruling 
over the legal constraints of the EIC as a joint-stock would directly impact the actions of the RAC, 
and vice versa. 
This was made painfully clear for the joint-stock and monopoly companies unanimously, with 
the almost simultaneous rulings in 1698 against their monopolistic privileges in one way or another. 
The Royal AfULFDQ&RPSDQ\¶V WUDGH WR$IULFDZDVRSHQHG WR VHSDUDWH WUDGHUVZKLFKDOWKRXJKSDLG
GXWLHVRQWKHLUFDUJRDQGUHFRJQLVHGWKH5$&¶VPRQRSRO\ZHUHUHJDUGHGE\VRPHDVWKHEHJLQQLQJRI
its downfall.181 7KH(DVW,QGLD&RPSDQ\VHYHUHGLQWRWZRµ2OG¶DQGµ1HZ¶with disdain for the old 
6WXDUW PRQDUFKV OLQJHULQJ LQ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V VSOLW182 The Muscovy Company, too, although kept 
under one joint stock, was forced to include members previously turned away under the Act to 
Enlarge the Trade to Russia.183 Not only was ParlLDPHQW¶VDSSURDFKZRUOGZLGHE\WKRXJKEXW
broad interests by many lobbies of merchants had begun to emerge. As those clothiers and textile 
manufacturers in England lobbied against both African and East Indian interests, merchants 
particularly of the tobacco trade whom lobbied against the African Company also did against the 
company in Russia. Many leading agitators of the Muscovy Company; Edmund and Samuel Harrison, 
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Sir Gilbert Heathcote, and Robert Heysham, were prominent pamphleteers against the Royal African 
Company. Contrastingly, Nathaniel Gould, director of the RAC, was also a prominent opponent of the 
Muscovy Company.184 Interests were converging on a global scale, whether they were of merchants, 
government officials or domestic manufacturers, and as the political governance of the English 
Empire broadened its reach in the Americas, East Indies and West Africa, the commercial interests 
would do so too. Marketplaces were becoming more varied as the seventeenth century turned to the 
eighteenth, with interests in England following suit, and nowhere was this more striking than in West 
Africa.  
The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa in 1698 was, at the turn of the eighteenth century, a 
settlement with not only global ramifications, but pre-dated by, and coinciding with, legislation that 
was itself influenced by overseas affairs. West Africa not only held global significance by 1712 for 
the commerce sailing to its shores, but in the political and legislative actions that surrounded it. The 
Parliamentary view of overseas commerce was undoubtedly one seen through a global lens, with 
coinciding legislation being implemented for commerce in Europe, the East Indies and West Africa in 
1698. Motivated by ideological reasons broadly opposing the Stuart chartered monopoly companies 
they may have been, but their actions were undoubtedly global, commercial and imperial in their 
focus. As political lobbies campaigned, and affected legal proceedings both in the East and West, they 
in turn shaped the emerging global commercial activities of the English, and then British, empires.  
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(Fig. 13 ± A map of the East Indies denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed 





(Fig. 14 - A map of Europe denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed 












(Fig. 15 - A map of the Americas denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods listed 







(Fig. 16 ± A map of the British Isles denoting the points of origin of a selection of goods 





III ± The Political and Imperial Agenda 
The Anglo-African commercial relationship in England and Africa 
The Company Outgoings help to illustrate much in the way of the organizational structure of the 
RAC, exposing its strengths and weaknesses in doing so. The infrastructure of Company supply and 
maintenance of their forts DQGVHWWOHPHQWVPD\KDYHEHHQDSULPHDUJXPHQWLQIDYRXURIWKH5$&¶V
continued existence post-1698, but also detrimental to its commercial prospects. Over the years, 
patterns began to emerge in their listed Outgoings cargoes which not only contained repeated listings 
of commodities; but the measures, weights and values of these goods, as well as the way in which 
they were recorded, were identical. For non-commercial cargoes intended to supply the Company 
factories, this was less of a problem, and consisted at times of the same quantities of foodstuffs, 
artisans tRROVDQG³1HFHVVDULHVIRUWKH&ountinJKRXVH´VKLSSHGLQ)HEUXDU\1RYHPEHU
January 1706 and so on.185  Yet this was a process not exclusive to the furnishing of Company 
settlements, and was carried out on a more frequent basis with commercial cargoes. Matching 
quantities of calicoes, European linens, woollen stuffs, East Indian textiles, tobacco and other such 
commodities were dispatched by the Company, sometimes with years apart. This was despite the 
constantly shifting demands across the wide array of polities and markets engaged in European trade 
on the African coast.186 The Company clearly had a less flexible commercial approach to Anglo-
African trade than that of the separate traders, whom did not engage in such repetitive cargoes over 
numbers of years. With cargoes bound for Africa having to be meticulously and precisely assorted to 
meet the subtle distinctions of West African demands between one community and the next, the Royal 
$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\¶VVWUXFWXUHRIWUDGHFOHDUO\SODFHGWKHPDWDVLJQLILFDQWGLVDGYDQWDJH187 This builds 
a greater reflection of the intricacies of the Anglo-African commercial relationship ± one in which 
many domestic British manufacturers came to rely heavily on African markets for their livelihoods at 
the turn of the eighteenth century.  
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Anglo-African trade not only witnessed a breadth of scale with wide-reaching global goods 
exchanged in West Africa, but was fundamental in impacting domestic manufacturing industries of 
England. As the English trade in enslaved Africans impacted Africa deeply, by the formative years of 
the eighteenth century, the reverse was also true. Regions of England were intrinsically economically 
linked with West Africa, and dependent on successful commerce with West African markets for their 
very livelihoods. Examining the operations of the RAC further also allows for a deconstructing 
analysis of the framework of the Company, and the way in which it operated, collaborating with 
numerous commercial rivals of Britain, relying in some cases on their goods and political support. 
Having given a rundown of the most frequently traded goods to West Africa recorded in the 
Outgoings; this section illustrates how it was on both a grand, national scale that the British economy 
relied on the West African trade, as well as of specific regional economies that operated almost 
entirely upon it.  
Classic estimates for Anglo-African trade were undermined by the inclusion of West Africa 
SDUWRIDZLGHUµH[WUD-(XURSHDQWKHDWUH¶RIWUDGHPLVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHLQWULQVLFUHOLDQFHWKDWWKHUHZDV
growing amongst particular textile manufacturers in England on African markets. Indeed, Ralph 
Davies estimated that domestic textile exports valued at £310,000 p.a. were shipped to the Americas, 
East Indies and West Africa combined between 1699 and 1701.188 Marion Johnson estimates the West 
African portion of this trade to be less than £100,000 p.a. on average, including re-exports, before 
1720, affected somewhat by the rumbling global warfare that took place almost uninterrupted, 1689-
1713. Textiles dominated, averaging 65% of British exports to Africa 1699-1720, with Iron being the 
single-largest traded commodity, averaging 10% of exports in the same period. What Johnson fails to 
DFFRXQWKXJHO\ IRUKRZHYHU LVZKDW FRQVWLWXWHG WKHaRI FRPPRGLWLHVGXEEHG µmiscellaneous¶
DQGµRWKHUJRRGV¶ZKLFKLQFOXGHGQRQe of the above, nor any military stores (themselves accounting 
for around 2% of the export trade).189 Many of these consisted of the non-commercial goods listen in 
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reaching global origin are further mentioned in the section above. 
One central distinguishing factor that led the English to success in the West African trade 
was, certainly, their achievements in the cloth trade. It was a demand shared by English and West 
African markets, and both the domestic development of a wide range of cloths in England, as well as 
the vastly increasing numbers of linens shipped from the East Indies together, would greatly saturate 
the these West African desires, fuelling the English transatlantic slave trade. Of this much, historians 
are already aware. What further historical assessment can show however is that the development of 
the English trading to the Levant and Mediterranean was shaping the development of lighter draperies 
which would suit markets on the West African coast also. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, as 
well as the Ottoman Empire, were emerging as the dominant markets for the Northern European 
textile manufacturers, receptive to their demands of lighter textiles.190 As Charles Wilson puts it, the 
(QJOLVK DQG 'XWFK FORWKLHUV µGHVSDWFKHG DQ ,WDOLDQ LQGXVWU\ VWUXFWXUDOO\ RVVLILHG¶ DQG effectively 
undercut the market. Throughout the seventeenth-century there was constant Anglo-Dutch 
competition, yet by the end of it, ³DQ LQFUHDVLQJ SHUFHQWDJH RI :HVW &RXQWU\ VHUJHV 1RUZLFK
stuffs...shaloons and camletVIRXQGWKHLUZD\WRWKHFXVWRPHUV>LQ(XURSH@E\GLUHFWURXWHV´191 These 
IDEULFV FRQVLGHUHG E\ HFRQRPLF KLVWRULDQV RI WKH SHULRG WR EH WKH µQHZ¶ GUDSHULHV RI WKH (QJOLVK
textile industry, were undoubtedly instrumental in carrying on the Anglo-African trade from the 1670s 
until the nineteenth century.192  
Assessments of the textile industry in England pre-GRPLQDWHGHFRQRPLFKLVWRULDQV¶ZRUNVLQ
the twentieth century. Since the 1960s and the likes of Charles Wilson, there has been little work 
published on a perhaps saturated and unfashionable historical area. Consequently, there is an entire 
ODFN RI DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW IRU WKH $IULFDQ PDUNHW IRU (QJOLVK WH[WLOHV ERWK RI WKH µQHZ¶ DQG µROG¶
draperies. Figures 17 and 18 below highlight the prevalence of the old compared with the new 
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exported to the West African coast at the turn of the eighteenth century, the former of which has been 
ULJKWIXOO\ DVVHUWHG E\ 3 - 7KRPDV DV EHLQJ D µORQJ GLVFDUGHG¶ VHFWLRQ RI WKH (QJOLVK HFRQRP\¶V
analysis in the eighteenth century.193 Subsequent defining works on the topic however, still largely 
ignored this issue. Wilson himself gives a somewhat fragmented account of the development of 
English textiles in this period. There is much discussion of Dutch competition and European rivalry 
which dominated foreign markets, yet his overall analysis remains somewhat misleading. Kerseys 
were a staple of the old drapery sorts, their production in England dating from the C13th. Similarly, 
WKH DZNZDUGO\ GXEEHG µFORWKFORWKH¶ ZHUH ZRROOHQ VWDSOHV WKDW Dre written as such due to their 
indistinctive, traditional weight and texture.194 Says were more complex. Norwich and its surrounding 
towns had long been a home to English textile manufacture, once producing heavier woollens 
commonly associated with the EnglDQG¶VFORWKLHULQGXVWU\,WZDVLQWKHODWHVL[WHHQWKFHQWXU\WKDWWKLV
began to change, with migration from the Low Countries particularly giving rapid industrial change to 
the make-up of these goods, making them lighter and cooler for southern overseas markets, by the 
early 1600s.195 Much of the same had begun to occur by the mid-seventeenth century, beginning a 
shift in the composition of says in some areas of England, in line with WKHOLJKWHUµQHZ¶GUDSHULHV<HW
JLYHQ WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\ H[SDQGHG GHILQLWLRQ RI µVD\V¶ WKDW QRZ HQFRPSDVVHG D ZLGH YDULHW\ RI
VWUXFWXUHV DFURVV WKH QDWLRQ¶V PDUNHWV WKRVH WH[WLOHV ZKLFK HYROYHG LQ SODFHV VXFK DV 1RUIRON DQG
Suffolk were recognisable by their differences. Says produced in Norfolk, by the early seventeenth 
FHQWXU\ KDG FRPH WR EH NQRZQ PRUH DV µ1RUZLFK VWXIIV¶ RU µ:RUVWHGV¶ 7KH VDPH ZDV WUXH IRU
Suffolk and Exeter.196 Those that continued to be known as says were largely those which continued 
WREHSURGXFHGWUDGLWLRQDOO\DVWKLFNHUKHDYLHUZRROOHQVDVWKH\KDGDOZD\VEHHQDVµROG¶GUDSHULHV
from their existence since the early 1500s. These were the traditional English woollens that were 
associated with the rise of the textile industry in the late medieval and renaissance eras, which began 
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to face pressures from migrating European textile industries to England during the French Wars of 
Religion and the Thirty Years War the forty years either side of 1600.197  
Wilson gives broad national approach to the trade, using mostly vague terminology of 
µZRROOHQV¶IUHTXHQWO\giving FRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVWRH[DPSOHVRI(XURSHDQWH[WLOHVVXFKDVµODNHQV¶
Dutch woollen goods. Furthermore, Wilson incredulously in this topic places greater weight not on 
the predominance of the goods manufactured, but the areas in which they were done so. Wilson charts 
,SVZLFK¶VGHFOLQHDVDFHQWUHRIWKHFORWKLQGXVWU\DVDWUHQGRIWKHLQGXVWU\DVDZKROHDWWKHWXUQRI
the seventeenth-century. Actually, taken broadly this was the beginning of new developments in cloth 
and drapery manufacturing.198  Regarding extra-Europeans too, Kerridge only hints towards this in his 
concluding points, stating the new threat facing producers of traditional European woollens was not 
foreign competition. Rather, he argued, it was GRPHVWLFFRPSHWLWLRQSURGXFLQJ³VZLIWLPLWDWLRQV´RI
East Indian fabrics themselves.199 Yet, this was not a new phenomenon, as imitation of European 
cloths had been occurring in England throughout the seventeenth century regarding Worsteds, 
baysadoes, serges, and others, and works as an illustration of the market developments of the early- 
and mid-seventeenth century. Indeed, subsequent to these too, English manufacturers busied 
themselves with attempts at replicating African cloths at home. In the 1740s and 1750s, repeated 
UHTXHVWVZHQWIURP/RQGRQWR&DSH&RDVW&DVWOHWRVKLSVDPSOHVRIµ$VKDQWHHDQG:K\GDKFORWK¶200  
When examining the Outgoings kept by the RAC, a picture of the domestic cloth trade contrary to the 
DVVHUWLRQV RI WKH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ KLVWRULDQV HPHUJHV 7DNLQJ VD\V NHUVLHV DQG µFORWK¶¶FORWKH¶
registered in the Outgoings DV µROG¶ GUDSHULHV DJDLQVW SHUSHWWV ED\V VHUJHV, stuffs and Worsteds, 
there were clearly comparable amounts of old and new draperies being exported to West Africa 1702-
1712. As can be seen in Figure 17 below, the percentage of old draperies only once dips below 27%, 
and averages at 37.5% of all English textiles exported. It was hardly insignificant. 
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(Fig.  17 ± Table illustrating the percentage of draperies, old and new, amongst the voyages to 




(Fig. 18 ± Percentage of draperies, old and new, amongst the voyages to West Africa per 
annum. Old Draperies featured; says, kersies, English clothe. New Draperies featured; perpetts, 










1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712
Old
New
Year Old New 
Total number of Voyages 
containing draperies 
1702 38% 62% 68 
1703 34% 66% 76 
1704 38% 62% 76 
1705 40% 60% 43 
1706 44% 56% 43 
1707 42% 58% 60 
1708 42% 58% 31 
1709 27% 73% 49 
1710 32% 68% 41 
1711 24% 76% 45 
1712 52% 48% 23 
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,W LV FHUWDLQ WKDW ³DW WKH HQG RI WKH VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\ ZRROOHQ WH[WLOHV ZHUH VWLOO
overwhelmingly the most important of the H[SRUWFRPPRGLWLHVSURGXFHGE\(QJODQGKHUVHOI´GHVSLWH
a nudging increase of the variation of goods interacting in English markets. Declining from 90 per 
FHQWRI/RQGRQ¶VH[SRUWPDUNHWLQWRSHUFHQWLQ-1701, textiles remained the central 
ingredient to a healthy English export trade ± and yet, unsurprisingly, the focus is unmistakably 
Eurocentric. Clay does give focus to West Africa, and it is the Northern coast which demands his 
interest ± QRWLQJWKDWWKH/HYDQW&RPSDQ\VKLSPHQWV³PRUHWKDQ doubled to an average 13,762 a year 
by 1666-72 and rose further to 20,075 by 1673-7, a level which was more or less maintained...until 
WKHHDUO\HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\´201 Whilst venturing further, from Anatolia to Persia, the focus is never 
stretched beyond a Mediterranean setting or much further than a European theatre of trade. In the 
information presented in the Outgoings as noted by the RAC, there is a distinctly untypical market 
share of draperies old, new and foreign between 1702 and 1712. Yearly analysis seen in figures 17 
and 18, shows how significant the various West African markets had been to the textile manufacturers 
RIWKHµROG¶GUDSHULHVRI(QJODQGThe West African markets, with their seemingly insatiable appetite 
for varieties of commodities and textiles, created for a short time at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
a surge in the production of merchandize that even modern historians had marked as in perpetual 
decline due to its lack of interest in the European trading theatre. Whilst the likes of Wilson and 
.HUULGJHDVVHUWHGWKDWWKHROGGUDSHULHVKDG³PDGHZD\IRUVHUJHVDQGSHUSHWXDQDV´LQDWUDGHZKLFK
was dominated by interaction with Europe, it was very much the case that these manufacturers were 
looking to the extra-European markets for their livelihood.202  As the Outgoings make clear, the 
FRPPRGLWLHVWKDWSURGXFHGWKHµROG¶GUDSHULHVKDGQRWGLVVHPLQDWHGQRUKDGWKH\DOOEHHQIRUFHGWR
GHYHORS WKHLU PDQXIDFWXUHUV DORQJ WKH OLQHV RI µQHZ¶ GUDSHUies. This was where the effects of the 
Anglo-African trade at the turn of the eighteenth century ran deepest in textile communities in Britain. 
6WDQOH\&KDSPDQ¶VFRQFHSWRIDµZLGHQLQJFLUFOHRIFXVWRPHUV¶ WKDWRFFXUUHG LQ WKHPLG-eighteenth 
century was occurring much earlier on the West African coast.203 Merchants and manufacturers were 
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losing trade amongst conventional and traditional markets as these shifted, as were those whom were 
already moving their focus to market demands further south in Europe and Africa These 
demographics were some of those met with the blossoming possibilities of the Anglo-African trade of 
which the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa in 1698 was its strongest catalyst.  
Furthering this, 0LWFKHOODSSOLHV&KDSPDQ¶VDUJXPHQWVRIWKHµZLGHQLQJFLUFOHVRIFXVWRPHUV¶
to the African coast with the RAC developing distant markets whilst relying on British clothiers to 
assume the direction of manufacturing. This approach is certainly accurate, yet lacking in 
incorporating the far greater role played by the separate traders in this process.204  Increasingly in the 
1690s, the RAC suffered great political opposition from lobbies of clothiers and dyers, with 
overwhelming support for the separate traders from the clothiers all over the country. Manufacturers 
from Berkshire, Devon, Essex, Gloucester, Norwich, Somerset, Southwark, Suffolk, Wiltshire, and 
Yorkshire all took part in lobbying against the RAC due to the &RPSDQ\¶V FRQWURO RYHU WH[WLOH
H[SRUWV7KLVFRQWUROLWVHOILQPDQ\ZD\VZRUNHGDJDLQVWWKHFRPSDQ\¶VIDYRXUFRPPHUFLDOO\RQWKH
African coast, and in Britain only provided fringe support from the weaving lobbies of Witney, 
Shrewsbury and Kidderminster.205 TKH&RPSDQ\¶VVXSSRUWPD\KDYHEHHQFRQFHQWUDWHGLQRQO\DIHZ
regions across the country, but the wealth delivered to the clothiers, manufacturers and dyers of those 
communities was in great proportions. Indeed, from Exeter and the surrounding towns of Devonshire, 
the RAC sold roughly £10,000 of serges ± a woollen fabric originating from the fifteenth century ± on 
WKH$IULFDQFRDVWHYHU\\HDUXQWLODSSUR[LPDWHO\PDNLQJ LWE\-RKQVRQ¶VHVWLPDWHVPRUHWKDQ
10% of the entire export trade to West Africa.206 
Matching this, the accounts of both Mitchell and Pettigrew give a good basis of the 
&RPSDQ\¶VVXSSRUWHUVLQWKHWH[WLOHLQGXVWULHVDOWKRXJKthey are perhaps a little thin. Given the focus 
of the RAC in the metropolitan too, there grew in the early-1700s VPDOOIRFXVVHGVXSSRUWIURP³WKH
'\HUV 3DFNHUV 6HWWHUV 'UDZHUV DQG &DOHQGDUV LQKDELWLQJ LQ DQG DERXW /RQGRQ´ that had, they 
declared³EHHQYHU\PXFKVXSSRUWHGE\WKHZRUNLQJDQGILWWLQJIRU6DOHWKH:RROOHQ0DQXIDFWXUHV
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usually exported in great 4XDQWLWLHVE\WKH5R\DO$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\´207 Similarly, modest support for 
WKH &RPSDQ\ JUHZ DPRQJVW WKH ³:HDYHUV 7XFNHUV DQG RWKHU $UWLILFHUV EHORQJLQJ WR WKH
PDQXIDFWXULQJRI3HUSHWXDQRHVIRU$IULFD´LQ([HWHU208 Makers of Cottons, Serges and other Woollen 
WH[WLOHVQDWLRQDOO\ZHUHDIIHFWHGE\WKHGHFOLQHRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VIRUWXQHVE\-9, all echoing that 
WKHLU ³7UDGH LVLQGDQJHURIEHLQJ ORVW WR WKH1DWLRQ WR WKH5XLQRI WKH3HWLWLRQHUV´209 Whilst the 
RAC may have ultimately been defeated by their separate trader opponents, the Company had 
developed strong commercial relationships with manufacturers in many regions of Great Britain 
whom now depended almost exclusively RQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VXFFHVV LQ$IULFD210 In this respect, the 
demands of the West African merchants and populations directly affected both the metropolitan and 
regional economies up and down England. Although scholars have repeatedly stressed the 
significance of the integrated Atlantic economy by the early eighteenth century, this has yet to have 
been done with the English and West African markets for the turn of the eighteenth century. 211 
,QLNRUL¶V assessments come closest VWDWLQJ WKDW ³WKH DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH UROH RI $IULFDQV LV EDVHG
WKHUHIRUHRQWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHJURZWKRI(QJODQG¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH´,PSDFWLQJHVSHFLDOO\
on the regions dominated by textile manufacture such as East Anglia, the West Country, West 
Midlands and Lancashire, Inikori nevertheless states this beginning in the period 1760-1780. As such, 
the Outgoings clearly provide evidence of these deep connections between England and West Africa 
over half a century earlier.212 For the textile industry of England, dominating English exports globally, 
historiography has been typically dismissive of this crucial West African market, providing, as 
+RVNLQV DVVHUWHG DQ ³LQVLJQLILFDQW IUDFWLRQ´ RI H[SRUW PDUNHWV LQ 213 This was clearly not the 
case. 
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With this in mind, it is worth analysing that amongst these pro-Company pamphlets the 
OREELHVZHUHVLJQDWRU\WRZHUHE\DQGODUJHQRWSHQQHGE\WKHPVHOYHVEXWE\WKH5$&¶VVHFUHWDU\
John Pery, as well as the Deputy Governor Thomas Pindar. Indeed, it appeared often enough that the 
weavers, workers and dyers operating with the RAC were less than forthcoming with their political 
support. The strong commercial relationships established by the Company with regional and 
metropolitan textile manufacturers, dyers and weavers was one of political allegiance, but of necessity 
through the livelihoods the Anglo-African trade conducted, controlled in these areas by the RAC. 
There was a very real apprehension amongst Company agents that they would be met with 
³RSSRVLWLRQ LQ SURFXULQJ 7UDGHV PHQV KDQGV´ WR VLJQ SUR-Company petitions by their textile 
manufacturers. 214  6LJQLILFDQW OHYHOV RI VFDUHPRQJHULQJ ZHUH SUHVHQW LQ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V FRHUFLYH
attempts to garner support, with relatively unfurnished claims that the Dutch would certainly 
³SURPRWH WKHLURZQHPDQXIDFWXUHVIRU WKHLURZQDGYDQWDJH´LI WKH5$&ZDVQRW IXOO\VXSSRUWHG215 
Even administrative and executive powers in the towns with strong commercial links to the Royal 
African Company were reluctant to lend their support politically, including the Mayor of Exeter.216 
Despite apparent Company support being submitted to Parliament, by 1709 there were clear leanings 
towards the separate traders once the RAC began struggling financially, something which was heavily 
discouraged by the Company.217 This was unsurprising, as the levels of total commerce, let alone 
perpetts and textiles from Exeter, had slipped into relative obscurity against the competition of the 
VHSDUDWHWUDGHUV$VWKH&RPSDQ\¶VOutgoings showed, for the entireties of 1708 and 1709 ± the last 
years of RAC commercial activity recorded ± there were only five voyages conducted by the 
Company to West Africa, two of which contained predominantly non-commercial supplies for the 
forts and settlements.218  
In this sense, the principle of freedom for the separate traders was a distinct commercial 
advantage on numerous levels. Successful merchants with a deeper understanding of the African 
markets held the freedom to choose from the plethora of the goods that existed in Britain, India, the 
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Americas and Europe not nearly as readily accessed by the Royal African Company. Indeed within 
the RAC, the Committee of Goods held its own monopoly on the direction of the Company 
commercially, holding the OLRQ¶V VKDUH RI GHFLVLRQV RQ WKH SURFHVV RI SXUFKDVLQJ WH[WLOHV PHWDOV
munitions and all other commodities purchased by the Company merchants.219 Although setting high 
VWDQGDUGVRIZRUN WKH&RPPLWWHH¶VQDUURZFRPPHUFLDO VFRSHFRXOGKDUGO\ VDWLDWH WKH LQFreasingly 
diverse and ever-changing demands of the complex West African coast.220 Focussing on specific 
commodities had political implications, providing few strong voices to lobby on their behalf as well 
as hindering practical operations on the African coast. These self-imposed restrictions were not the 
only problem the Committee created for themselves; their monopoly on the trade before 1698 led to 
the penalising of these manufacturers whom were thought to be cooperating with separate traders. 
Indeed, on numerous occasions in the 1680s and 1690s, textile workers and dyers were prohibited 
IURP&RPSDQ\FRQWUDFWVGXHWR³EHLQJFRQFHUQHGLQ,QWHUORSLQJWR*\QH\´221 After The Act to Settle 
the Trade to Africa, the Company was finding interloping incredibly difficult to tackle not just in 
Africa and at sea, but amongst those who provided their export commodities in Britain. Many of these 
individuals barred from working for the Company for this reason, such as George Peck in 1695, were 
soon reinstated due to their experience in manufacturing or dyeing, befitting of the demanding African 
markets. This, combined with the pressure the Committee placed on the workers for producing 
commodities of the best quality, alienated some whom were provided business by the Company and 
thus rescinded chances of political backing in the Anglo-African trade debates.222  
 Fundamentally, the Anglo-African commercial relationship was one which impacted not only 
on West Africa, as has been commonly asserted, but on English manufacturing markets which in turn 
affected political discourse. Where the separate traders argued for freedom, it undoubtedly benefited 
them in the practical application of trade. With the demands of African markets being so globally 
reaching, the separate traders had the liberty of choice in their wares. The RAC had no such luxury. 
This restrictive approach by the Company was to impact on its political development, contributing to 
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only the small pockets of political support it received from the regions of England. Additionally, the 
impact West Africa had on English economic development at the turn of the eighteenth century was to 
encourage the production of many waning textile markets within England itself. The old draperies of 
England were not yet dead, in a large part due to West Africa. Despite the centralised constraints of 
the RAC however, this was in keeping with their nature as a colonial establishment on the West 
African coast. As mentioned above, this was the foremost concern of Parliament regarding the 1698 
Act, and one which the documents in question assist in presenting a far deeper understanding. Not 
only was this the prime implication of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa, but a deeper 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH6WDWH¶VLPSHULDODQGFRORQLDODPELWLRQV 
 
Forts, Factories and Settlements of the RAC: Establishing the Imperial Agenda 
It is impossible to truly understand the developments of the African trading debates without an 
understanding of the imperial ideology of the English (and then British) state. The monarFK\¶VZLVKWR
expand and control the Atlantic economy went further than regulating trade, with desires of both 
GHYHORSLQJ WUDGH ZLWK WKH µFDVK-ULFK 6SDQLVK $PHULFDV¶ DV ZHOO as expanding English interests in 
Africa by establishing plantations on the coast, similar to those in the Caribbean.223 Even recently, 
colonial ambition s and the development of plantations in West Africa has been steeply overlooked by 
KLVWRULDQV6LPRQ1HZPDQ¶VZRUNRQ7KHDevelopment of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic 
barely touches the work done by the crown and Company at the turn of the eighteenth century in 
establishing plantations in West Africa.224 In reality, bRWKDWWDLQLQJ WKHµDVLHQWR¶FRQWUDFW± the legal 
right to trade enslaved Africans to the Spanish Americas ± and cultivating crops and producing 
commodities for sale on the West African coast were long-term goals of the state ruled by Charles II, 
as well as by Walpole. Indeed, although the Company may have occasionally meandered from this 
shared view ± most notably when trying to settle its immense debt by the sale of its forts in 1697 ± the 
RAC had parallel commitments.225 For establishing plantations in West Africa, it began with a desire 
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to out-strip their Dutch superiors in the Atlantic in the 1660s and 1670s, and continued under a policy 
WKDW SRVW  OHJLWLPLVHG WKH &RPSDQ\¶V H[LVWHQFH ORQJ DIWHU WKH GHSRVLWLRQ RI LWV UR\DO SDWURQV
This was met with equally long-running opposition from the American plantations, and although 
documentation of the gripes of the plantations remains sporadic, there was an ever-present feeling 
within the ranks of the RAC that justification was necessary. Indeed, when political dissent against the 
Company was rife in the colonies at the turn of the eighteenth century, deputy governor Thomas 
Pindar commissioned pamphlets to be written, published and made readily available in Nevis, 
Montserrat, Jamaica, Barbados and Virginia. Writing between 1708 and 1709, Pindar attempted to 
convince colonists that the Company plantations were not the iVVXHEXWRIFRXUVH WKH'XWFK³,WLV
VXSSRVHG WKH (QHP\¶V WR WKH &RPSDQ\ PD\ KDYH VHQW WR \RXU &RORQH\V WKH VXUQLRXV DQG IDOVH
SDPSKOHWVWKH\GLVWULEXWHG´226 The Company warned,  
³7KH&OLPDWHEHLQJSURSHUIRU6XJDU,QGLJR&RWWRQDQG*LQJHUDQGWKH'XWch once gaining 
the Possession of the Country will have the Natives under their direction...and [will] soon 
make considerable Colonies there, by the multitude of hands and import to all Europe 
sufficient quantities of those Goods at much lower prices, than can be afforded from the 
British Plantations, none of which can be done provided there be a British Company with a 
-RLQW6WRFNDEOHWRPDLQWDLQDQ(TXDOO3RZHURQWKH&RDVWZLWKWKHP´227 
7KH%ULWLVK&RPSDQ\¶VFRQWLQXLQJDWWHPSWVWRGRWKHVDPHZHUHQRWXQQoticed however. With these 
pamphlets, the Company admitted their knowledge of the possibilities of cultivation in West Africa 
DQG ZLVKHG WR PDLQWDLQ DQ µHTXDO SRZHU¶ ZLWK WKH 'XWFK LQ WKLV UHVSHFW <HW WKLV ZDV FRQWLQXDOO\
VKURXGHGE\WKH&RPSDQ\¶VRZQSURpaganda even after 1712 when the African trade debates had all 
EXWFHDVHGDQGWKHWUDGHEHHQODLGRSHQ,WUHPDLQHGWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH&RPSDQ\WKDWLWZDV³GLVDEOHG
from making any manner of Profit from their Lands; for they can neither raise Tobacco, nor Sugar, 
QRU &RWWRQ QRU ,QGLJR QRU DQ\ RWKHU &RPPRGLWLHV 3URGXFHG LQ WKH $PHULFDQ 3ODQWDWLRQV´ ,W
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FRQFOXGHGTXLWHFRQFLVHO\³7KH$IULFDQODQGVZLOOSURGXFHQRWKLQJHOVH´228 Legally, these comforts 
to the plantations were based on little fact. From 1712, given the absence of legislative rulings by 
Parliament at the expiry of the1698 Act, the RAC continued to operate very much within the 




incouragement of the undertakers in the discovering the Golden Mines and settling of 
Plantations...by one body Politick and Corporate...and...shall be persons able and capable in 
Law to have, take, purchase, receive, possess and enjoy Masons, Messuages, Lands, 
7HQHPHQWVUHQWVOLEHUWLHVSULYLOHJHVDQGKHUHGLWDPHQWVRIZKDWVRHYHUNLQG´229 
The latter domestic affections outlined for the Company in 1672; the masons, lands and privileges, 
were representative of the development of English political society by 1712. This was no longer the 
case for the Company, whom were already in debt to the tune of £153,413 in 1692, rising to £301,195 
by 1708. Indeed, the Hanoverian successors were so disinterested with the RAC that they chose not to 
pay £2000 of debts owed to the Company between 1714 and 1721.230 In Africa however, the remit of 
the RAC had remained very much the same. Trade did continue post-1712, and even boomed until the 
6RXWK6HD%XEEOH¶VHIIHFWVZHUHIHOWLQWKHHDUO\Vwith its final descent of activity in the years 
surrounding 1725.231 Efforts at creating plantation-style communities which produced commodities 
had continued to be examined right through the Anglo-$IULFDQ WUDGH GHEDWHV DQG WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
imperial significance was to grow in the post-war settlement of 1713. 
 Indeed, the signifLFDQFH RI WKH 5$&¶V PRQRSROLVWLF DUJXPHQWV ZHUe such that even the 
separate traders were pushing for a new, regulated company to be established for the Anglo-African 
trade. Those with interests in a new trade to the Spanish American colonies were beginning to do so 
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too. Previously, this had been asserted amongst the plethora of arguments the pro-company lobby 
SRVWXODWHG ZKHUHE\ WKH 5$& ZDV LGHDOO\ VHW IRU ³PDNLQJ DQ\ DGYDQWDJHRXV &RQWUDFWV ZLWK WKH
Spaniards, or Portugueze, to furnish them with Negroes in WKHLU :HVW ,QGLHV´ 232  As political 
developments in 1710 and 1711 gave the Tories more dominance in Parliament, these could become 
realistic ambitions.233 Both the crown and parliament were firmly in favour of a newly established 
company for engaging in trade to 6SDLQ¶V American colonies by 1710, deemed so essential to the post-
war settlement that would eventually be signed in 1713.234 ³8QLWLQJ WKH 7UDGHV WR *XLQHD DQG WKH
Spanish West-,QGLHV´ WRJHWKHU LQWR D VLQJOH FRPSDQ\ PD\ KDYH EHHQ D VWHS WRR IDU IRU WKH Qow 
powerful lobby of the separate traders, and made little economic sense to give the RAC, still crippled 
with debt, further economic responsibility. Despite this however, the political philosophy and imperial 
ideology that existed within these arguments cRUUHODWHG ZLWK WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V intentions greatly. 
Established in 1711, the South Sea Company was responsible for managing the national debt the 
government had accumulated during the War of Spanish Succession (now calculated at over £9.4m), 
and developing commercial relations with the Spanish Americas.235 Political leanings of the new Tory 
JRYHUQPHQWOHGE\+DUOH\ LQJDYHSUHFHGHQFHWRWKH5$&¶VQHZUROHIURPRISURYLGLQJ
enslaved Africans to the South Sea Company. Indeed, what was considered a firm basis of established 
contacts across the Atlantic and a working imperial infrastructure were dominant themes of the 
5$&¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQ236 This decision was influenced greatly by the African trade debates, with Defoe 
claiming that it was the African CompaQ\DORQH WKDW³>was] capable to enter into Contracts for the 
VXSSO\LQJLWDQGDUHDORQHFDSDEOHRISHUIRUPLQJWKHFRQWUDFWV´237 The Tory ministry concurred, and 
the SSC directors agreed to work in collaboration with the RAC, it making both political and 
economic sense to entrust the African Company providing 4,800 enslaved Africans per year to the 
SSC. 238 
                                                          
232
 2EVHUYDWLRQVRQ6RPHRIWKH$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\¶VODWH3ULQWHG3DSHUV (London, 1709) p.1 Accessed in ECCO. Date 
Accessed: 06/03/2014. 
233
 Swingen; Competing Visions pp.186-7. 
234
 Thomas; The Slave Trade pp.235-6. 
235
 Paul Kennedy; The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 
(London, 1989) p.137. 
236
 Elizabeth Donnan; The Early Days of the South-Sea Company, 1711-1718 (Washington, 1930) pp.428-9. 
237
 Daniel Defoe; Brief Account p.75. 
238
 Swingen; Competing Visions p.189. 
88 
 
 Swingen addresses the scholarly concerns that the RAC was too pre-occupied with securing 
the asiento contract to make its case against the looming expiry of the Ten Percent Act in 1712. Given 
the multitude of pamphleteering campaigns it was engaged in the years of 1711-12, this was unlikely. 
Indeed, it would be more accurate to echo the sentiments of Defoe - biased as he may have been - that 
WKH VHSDUDWH WUDGHUV¶ IUDFWXUHG DLPV ZHUH PRUH GDPDJLQJ WR VHFXULQJ D ELOO IRUPDOO\ RSHQLQJ WKH
Anglo-African trade statutorily.239 Not only the separate traders¶ divisions, but the unity of the African 
Company and the political assistance of their new allies of the South Sea Company even defeated a 
bill for an open trade in the House of Lords.240 Less addressed directly is the reason the African 
&RPSDQ\¶V IUDPHZRUNSURYLGHG WKHEDVLVRIWKH6RXWK6HD&RPSDQ\¶VFRQWUDFWDQG WUHDW\ZLWKWKH
6SDQLVKLQ7KHLQIOXHQFHVRIWKH5$&¶VFKDUWHUDQGLPSHULDl agenda were striking. 
7KH $VLHQWR ³RU &RQWUDFW IRU $OORZLQJ WKH 6XEMHFts of Great Britain the Liberty of 
,PSRUWLQJ 1HJURHV LQWR WKH 6SDQLVK $PHULFDV´ ZDV D PDUN RI WKH VLJQLILFDQW YLFWRU\ %ULWDLQ KDG
DFKLHYHG LQ WKH:DURI6SDQLVK6XFFHVVLRQ6LJQHGE\³WKH&DWKROLF.LQJ´3KLOLS9*HRUJH , E\
representatives of the French Guinea Company, it allocated the formal transition of the transatlantic 
WUDGLQJFRQWUDFWIURP)UHQFKWR%ULWLVKKDQGV6LPSO\WKHDVLHQWRFRQWUDFWZDV³WRVXSSO\WKH6SDQLVK
West-,QGLHVZLWK%ODFN6ODYHVIRUWKH7HUPRI7KLUW\<HDUV´IURP-1743. IndHHG³2QHKXQGUHG
and forty four thousand Negroes, Piezas de India, of both sexes, and of all Ages, at the rate of Four 
WKRXVDQG DQG HLJKW KXQGUHG 1HJURHVLQ HDFK RI WKH VDLG 7KLUW\ <HDUV´ ZHUH LQWHQGHG WR EH
shipped.241 Given the Royal African Company had only managed to transport 150,000 slaves to the 
American colonies in the Americas in 50 years from 1672-1722, the contract was ambitious.242 Being 
settled after the decisive British victory in the War of Spanish Succession however, the trade became 
as much WKHµVSRLOVRIZDU¶DVDPXWXDOWUDGLQJDJUHHPHQW,QGHHGDFRPPHUFLDODUUDQJHPHQWLWPD\
have principally been, yet the terms of which were unmistakeably imperialistic.  
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Although the Royal African Company had only a year previously lost its monopoly, and the 
national trend on the Anglo-African trade appeared to be separating trade for the individual merchant 
and imperialism for the collective state, The South Sea Company attained a monopoly on the trade in 
enslaved Africans to the Spanish Americas. In 1713, despite the outcome of the African trade debates, 
the SSC was granted privileges, rights and prerogative that were unseen since the Stuart monarchies 
of the seventeenth century.  
³$VVLHQWLVWV´ WKH DJUHHPHQW VWDWHG ³PD\ PDNH XVH RI (QJOLVK Ports...for the Management 
and Direction of this Assiento, as well as in the Ports of America, as in the Inland Places [of 
Spanish America]...that are to go ashore in all the Ports, where they shall be allowed to settle 
and regulate their Factories, as well that they may go with the greater conveniency and 
security, as that they may provide all things necessary for the receiving the Vessels that shall 
JRZLWK1HJURHV´ 
Covering the vast majority of Spanish American colonies, the act regarded the ports of Buenos Ayres, 
Panama and Peru as its central focus, although was not limited to these if other commercial 
opportunities were to arise. 
³7KH VDLG $VVLHQWLVWV PD\ 1RPLQDWH LQ DOO WKH 3RUWV DQG &KLHI 3ODFHV RI $PHULFD -XGJHV
Conservators of this Assiento, whom they may remove and displace, and appoint others at 
pleasure...[with]...All Audiences, Ministers and Tribunals, Presidents, Captians Genral, 
Governors, Corregidores, Great Alcaldes, and other Judges and Justices whatsoever, the Vice-
Roys of those Kingdoms included, EHLQJ IRUELGGHQ WR PHGGOH WKHUHZLWK´ 1HLWKHU ZDV DQ
HPEDUJR RQ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V DFWLRQV SHUPLWWHG OHJDO QRU WKH VHL]XUH RI HLWKHU 6RXWK 6HD RU
5R\DO $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\ ³VWRFN JRRGV RU HIIHFWV´ DOWKRXJK WKHVH ZHUH QRW LQIUHTXHQW
occurrences).243  
As well as in the extent of their legal prerogative, the commercial procedure was decreed in much the 
VDPHZD\RIWKH5R\DO$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\LQLWVGD\VRIPRQRSRO\³7KH6KLSVVKDOOEHVHDUFKHGRQ
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DUULYDO´DQGLIDQ\LOOHJDOJRRGVRUFRQWUDEDQGGLVFRYHUHG³WKH\VKDOOEe Seized [and] that those who 
DUHJXLOW\VKDOOEHVHYHUHO\SXQLVKHGDQGWKHLU0HUFKDQGL]HVDQGHIIHFWV&RQILVFDWHGRU%XUQW´7KH
MXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH6RXWK6HD&RPSDQ\¶VDELOLW\WRGHDOSXQLVKPHQWVWRLQWHUORSHUVZDVRQHZKLFKWKH
Royal African Company had not enjoyed since 1696, with the ruling of William v. Dockwra being; 
³7KH.LQJ PD\FUHDWH D FRUSRUDWLRQRIPHUFKDQWV DQGJLYH WKHPE\FKDUWHUDQ H[FOXVLYH
right to trade, and hold territories, within certain limits therein described´; but a clause 
prRKLELWLQJ RWKHUV WR WUDGH ZLWKLQ WKH VDLG OLPLWV ³XQGHU SDLQ RI LPSULVRQPHQW DQG WKH
forfeiture and loss both of their ships and good wheresoever found...and giving power to enter 
LQWRVHDUFKDQGVHL]HVKLSVDQGJRRGV´LVYRLG´244 
This was not all, witK WKH ULJKW RI FRQVWUXFWLQJ ³+RXVHV RU 0DJD]LQHV´ LQ ZKLFK WR EH XVHG DV
factories and settlements for the South Sea Company factors. Constant shipments of supply were 
SHUPLWWHG ³WR NHHS FRQVWDQWO\ 0DJD]LQHV ILOOHG ZLWK &ORWKLQJ 0HGLFLQHV 3URYLVLRQV DQd other 
Necessaries, in all the Factories that shall be established. Effectively, British colonisation of sections 
RI WKH 6SDQLVK $PHULFDV ZDV QHJRWLDWHG LQ WKH $VLHQWR 7UHDW\ ZLWK ³WKH )DFWRUV RI WKLV
Assiento...allowed to hire such Parcels of Land as they shall think fit, in the neighbourhood of the 
Places where the Factories shall be established, in order to Cultivate the said Lands, and make 
3ODQWDWLRQVLQZKLFKWKH\PD\UDLVHIUHVK3URYLVLRQVIRUWKHLU5HOLHIDQG6XEVLVWHQFH´ 
As in the West Indies, mainland North America and West Africa, the British settlement was 
one of colonialism and imperialism as much as it was of commercialism; one which had modelled 
itself on its effectual joint-stock predecessor, the Royal African Company. This was not without the 
5$&¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQHLWKHU WKURXJKRXW-XQHDQG-XO\WKH66&HVWDEOLVKHGWKHµ&RPPLWWHHIRU
WKH$VVLHQWR¶ZKLFKKDGUHSHDWHGGLUHFWFRQVXOWDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHPRVWHIIHFWXDOZD\WRHVWDEOLVKWKH
trade. Indeed, at their very first meeting in JXO\WKHSULQFLSDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQZDVRI³SURSHU3ODFHVLQ
ZKLFK WR6HWWOH)DFWRU\VRU6HWWOHPHQWVDQGKRZPDQ\DQGZKDW2IILFHUV DW HDFKSODFH´$PRQJVW
other things were company salaries, commission, operations management and other administrative 
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tasks with which the Royal African Company was of prime place to be used as a framework.245 In the 
finalised agreement between the RAC and SSC, the operation of the collaborative trade signed upon 
was very much a shipment of enslaved Africans from African Company factories, settlements and 
plantations to those of the South Sea Company.246 Regardless of the progress made by the separate 
traders in the years of African trading debates and the deconstructing of the national monopoly, the 
fundamental principle establishing the Royal African Company had remained intact. It had thrived in 
its example, leading to the establishment of the South Sea Company. And, although by the late 1720s 
the memory of both joint-stocks was dominated by their ultimate decline, the imperial agenda 
HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH 5$& FRQWLQXHG WR DVFULEH WKH %ULWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHODWLRQVKLS WR $IULFD
throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries. The RAC as a colonial proprietor and 
producer, as much as a commercial venture, was cemented in its most turbulent times of the 1690s by 
WKHUXOLQJRIWKH$FWWR6HWWOHWKH7UDGHWR$IULFD7KH$FW¶VOHJLVODWLRQRIDOOPHUFKDQWVWRSD\
WHQ SHU FHQW GXWLHV ZLWK WKH LQWHQW WR ³EHWWHUHQDEOH WKH VDLG 5R\DOO $IULFDQ &RPSDQ\ WKHLU
Successors and AssigQVWRPDLQWDLQWKHVDLG&DVWOHVDQG)RUWV´FDUULHGWKURXJKWKHGHEDWHVIRUWZR
decades so, in 1712, these opinions had only been solidified.247 
³7KDWWKH)RUWVDQG7UDGHDUH LQVHSDUDEOH7KDW WKH7UDGHZLWKRXW WKH)RUWVFRXOGQHYHUEH
gained, nor can now be PDLQWDLQ¶G$QGWKH)RUWVZLWKRXWWKH7UDGHKDGQHYHUEHHQWKRXJKW
of, much less had been built or preserved at such a vast Expence, as has been laid out upon 
WKHP´7KH&RPSDQ\DV³SXUFKDVHUV´RIWKHIRUWVZHUH³DWWKHKD]DUGRI/RVLQJWKHZKROH
[of] tKH$GYHQWXUH´LIWKH\ZHUHVDFULILFHG248  
It was not simply through the asiento trade and the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht that the 
Royal African Company still held significance. Since the escalation of the African trade debates at the 
end of the seventeenth century, the Company looked to re-energise its possessions on the African 
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coast. Crippled, captured or destroyed in the War of the League of Augsburg, it was difficult for the 
Company to justify both the Anglo-$IULFDQWUDGH¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKH&RPSDQ\¶VIRUWLILFDWLRQVDVZHOODV
³WKDW WKRVH)RUWVDQG&DVWOHVKDYHEHHQKLWKHUWREHHQPDLQWDLQ¶GE\ WKHSUHVHQW$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\´
with their supply and maintenance in relative destitution.249 It was with this mindset that the RAC 
began a rapid acceleration of the repair, re-supply and maintenance of the forts, as well as continuing 
attempts to establish Company-owned plantations in West Africa from 1699.250 Not only were active, 
well-maintained forts needed to persuade the governments of the early eighteenth century that the 
fortifications were necessary and efficient, but with the promise of a ten per cent duty, legally 
certified only one year previously, it gave economic credence for the Company to spend greater 
amounts on the fortifications after the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa.251 
³$IWHU ´ DVVHUWV :LOOLDP 6W &ODLU ³WKH (QJOLVK EHJDQ DQ H[WHQVLYH UHEXLOGLQJ WKDW
changed its shape and appearance and greatly increase the area within WKHSHULPHWHUZDOOV´252 This 
decision was far more politically charged than has been previously assessed, with it being no 
coincidence the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was settled only one year previously. Rather, it was 
necessary for the forts that were accused en masse by the separate traders of being in disrepair and of 
no use, to be brought to their best and most profitable condition ± especially with the expected funds 
the 1698 Act was to bring in.253 It was with this mind-set that Cape Coast Castle WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
headquarters on the West African Coast, was transformed by 1710 with brick walls fourteen feet 
thick, accompanied by 74 artillery guns and containing quarters for the Agents, factors, writers, 
artificers and soldiers. Water tanks and granaries, vaults of rum and other spirits, a chapel and 
potential cells for 1,000 enslaved Africans had featured in the extension of the Castle, with many 
other additions being made to the English forts along the Gold Coast.254 This was matched with a vast 
increase in the number of Africans, both enslaved and employed, that came under the Company¶V
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jurisdiction at the turn of the century, and a greater diversification of the roles they carried out.255 The 
training of castle slaves had been formally encouraged from at least 1695, with some British artisans 
whom travelled to West Africa were paid extra for every castle slave they trained in their respective 
craft. Yet they had become so necessary to supplement the high mortality rates among Europeans that 
the English, Dutch and Danish companies VDZ:HVW$IULFDQV¶SUHVHQFHLQWKHIRUWVDQGIDFWRULHVDV
essential to their maintenance and growth. The RAC, in 1702, even had the treatment and status of 
their slaves codified making it mandatory for all company slaves to be taught skills to enhance their 
value and utility, and given specific roles in the forts. Bricklayers, carpenters, smiths, armourers, 
coopers, stoneblowers, labourers, and even soldiers were positions taken up by West Africans in the 
British forts. Their significance was so great that they were to be cared and provided for when in ill 
health, and were even permitted freedom to marry other slaves, or, over time, even free Africans from 
the communities outside Company jurisdiction.256  
'DOE\ 7KRPDV LQ KLV WHQXUH DV WKH &RPSDQ\¶V FHQWUDO JRYHUQRU RI &DSH &RDVW &DVWOH
increased the number of castle-slaves and African workers consistently. Initially increasing the 
QXPEHURIVODYHVDQG&DVWOHµJURPPHWWRHV¶LQKHHPSOR\HGWKHPLQSODQting corn, cotton and 
sugar canes in ever greater numbers. He continued to request investment from the RAC in London in 
the form of more enslaved Africans, subsequently requesting a further fifty Castle slaves to work in 
the British factories and trading pRVWV ³1HJURHV PDOH 	 IHPDOHZRXOG EH RI JUHDW XVH 	 JUHDW
SURILW´257 7KH&RPSDQ\¶V IDFWRUVZHUHZLOOLQJ DOWKRXJK ODFNHG WKH UHVRXUFHV DQG IXQGV WR VXSSRUW
7KRPDV¶YLVLRQDQGFKDUWHUHGKLPZLWKLWVVROHUHVSRQVLELOLW\³,I\RXFRXOGSURSRVHDSURSHU6FKeme 
and a fit place for the doing of it on the Gold Coast, I think people would...be induced to...employ 
WKHPVHOYHV LQ SODQWLQJ LQGLJR WREDFFR FRWWRQ DQG FRXQWU\ WUDGH´ 258  Despite these large 
developments, almost no information has been put forward surrounding the actual Company 
shipments to the forts and settlements during this time. The Outgoings of the RAC however, provide 
ample information regarding not only their supply and maintenance, but also the increasing focus 
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being made by the Company on crop cultivation, settlement expansion, and the establishing of 
SODQWDWLRQV LQ:HVW$IULFD(YHQ LQ WKHEOHDNHVWGD\VRI WKH&RPSDQ\¶V ILQDQFHV LQ-1710, the 
5$&¶VSULRULW\SODFHGRQWKHFRORQLDOSXUSRVHRIWKHIRUWVLVWHOOLQJ  
This was not restricted to the English Royal African Company either, as the Danish 
increasingly turned towards establishing a plantation society in West Africa as well. During the 
eighteenth century, the profits of the Danish slave trade wavered increasingly, owing in part to the 
lack of a substantial Danish West Indian plantation economy which had only begun to be developed 
after 1672, and to the fierce competition introduced by the English separate traders. In response, the 
Danish sought to produce goods on the Gold Coast, where their forts and factories had been under 
their control since the late-1650s, and establish plantations.259 Indeed, it has been asserted that in 
many ways the Danes led the way in establishing plantation societies on the West African coast.260 
Their factories were further developed socially and culturally as well as economically, particularly 
after the turn of the eighteenth-century, with the first schoolhouses and protestant missionaries, 
alongside the cultivation of coffee and tobacco. It was even these prohibitive costs that were a 
definitive factor in their inaugural abolition of the slave trade.261  
For the Royal African Company though, it is not difficult to see how the maintenance and 
supply of the fortifications was so financially crippling. Overall there were 39 voyages undertaken by 
the RAC on 38 individual ships, with one ship, the Freeman, sailing twice in 1703 and 1705, 
respectively. With 1702 and 1705 being the exceptions, every single voyage undertaken between 1702 
and 1709 by the RAC, either in collaboration with separate traders or apart, contained goods intended 
for the maintenance of the forts and factories on the West African coast. In 1702, 5 out of the 16 
voyages - 31% - contained goods of supply, and overwhelmingly construction. In 1705, this figure 
was 67%, or 5 out of the 9 voyages. As such, there is little need to separate the voyages into those 
commercial and non-commercial given that most voyages contained evidence of both collections of 
goods. There were a handful of voyages however, that contained exclusively factory goods, tools and 
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equipment, items of construction and land cultivation. Three ships sent in 1702 (Christoher, Malagata 
and Vulcan) as well as one sent in 1704 (Angola Frigate), one in 1706 (Nicholson) and one in 1709 
(Pinder) contained far larger bulks of factory goods than the other voyages, with a far broader 
collection of merchandise overall. Indeed, those sailing in 1702 contained much evidence of the 
&RPSDQ\¶VLPPHGLDWHSRVW-1699 drive to repair, resupply and renovate the infrastructure of the forts 
and factories, as well as arm the garrisons that existed therein. Huge re-construction was clearly 
underway with 20,000 bricks being sent in August 1702 to the coast, along with tools listed together 
VXFK DV ³ VKRYHOV 	 Spades...1 Crane...bundles [of] spades and saws...graplings...grindstone..., 
Brickmakers...1 Primare Bucacaneere Guns, 2 Demi Culverins...drawbridge chains...ladles and 





packed style of construction, ready for assembly in on the West African coast. There were in fact 
numerous instances within the document whereby a wide array of commodities and items were listed 
DV IRU H[DPSOH ³ 7XQQV RI 0DWHULDO >WR@ %XLOG D %RDWW´ DV ZDV GRQH RQ WKH Tunsonberg in 
February, 1703. Similar assumptions can be made of both the houses and warehouses, certainly 
regarding the expansion the Company settlements were undergoing. Further to this, the significance of 
WKH YDULRXV DUWLVDQV¶ WRROV LV JUHDW JLYHQ WKH VFDOH DW ZKLFK WKH\ ZHUH EHLQJ WUDQVSRUWHG 7KH
estimated size of Cape Coast Castle being not much larger than an English manor house in the 1690s, 
there was little chance of manufacturing, maintenance or cultivation on any great scale. 263  The 
enlargement process that would continue throughout the eighteenth century began at its turn however, 
and these shipments were likely some of the first in developing Cape Coast into its more functional 
DQGFRORQLDOVHWWOHPHQWFRPSOHWHZLWKFDUSHQWHU¶VVKRSVPLWK\VWRFN\DUGDQGµLQGXVWULDODUHD¶DV
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well as the attempted cultivation grounds.264 Nine palm trees were also sent from the Americas to 
stand tall in and around the castle in August, 1702 and, giving a sense of the pageantry of British 
agents, governors and officers in West Africa, sedan chairs were also present amongst cargoes.  
Alongside the large-VFDOHDUWLOOHU\µ*XQV¶VHQWWRIRUWLI\WKHJDUULVRQVKXQGUeds of muskets, 
pistols, sabres, swords and blunderbusses were frequently shipped as armaments for the soldiers to 
use, DORQJZLWKWRQVRIDPPXQLWLRQ,QGHHGWKLVZDVDFFRPSDQLHGLQ$XJXVWZLWK³JUHQDGLHU
FDSSV >DQG@  VROGLHUV FRDWV´ LQ 'HFHPEHU  ZLWK D IXUWKHU ³&DVH >RI@ 6ROGLHUV &RDWHV DQG
&DSSV´DQGDJDLQLQ$SULOZLWK³ER[HVRIVROGLHUVFORWKHV´7KHVHFRQWLQXHGWREHVSRUDGLFDOO\
sent, along with weaponry befitting the regiment ± specifically halberds and grenades ± until 1709. 
Furthering to this were frequent listings of drums, trumpets, flags, signals and other miscellaneous 
military supplies. Noted on more than one occasion amongst Company cargo as well were gun parts, 
small quantities of wrought iron, bullet moulds, mortar piecHV KDPPHUORFNV ILUHORFNV ³ULYHOOH
SXQFKHUV´ JXQ FDUULDJHV JXQSRZGHU DQG JUHDWHU TXDQWLWLHV RI VPLWKV WRROV 0DULRQ -RKQVRQ KDV
VWDWHGWKDWLWLVOLNHO\LURQZKHQQRWHGDVµZURXJKW¶ZDVLQSDUWRULQZKROHVPDOODUPDPHQWVEHLQJ
shipped to the African coast. 265  Coupled with the bullet moulds, serving the only purpose of 
ammunition manufacturing, as well as assembly parts of arms, suggests greatly that part of the 
DIRUHPHQWLRQHGµLQGXVWULDODUHD¶ZDVGHGLFDWHGWRWKHPDQXIDFWXULQJRIZHDSRQU\IRUXVHLQWKHIRUWV 
as well as for trading purposes with the local native populations. Along the lines of production, this 
was not all. 
In 1702 and 1703, three individual cargoes listed non-specific Mills amongst their lots, with 
RQHFDUJRDOVRFRQWDLQLQJVRPH³&RSSHU3RW>V@ IRU%RLOLQJ1HJURHV´$OWKRXJKWKHKDUURZLQJDVSHFWV
of English slavery did frequently bring many lives to an abrupt and gruesome end, it was more likely, 
given the accompanying cargo, that this was a pot used in an attempt to establish plantations with 
tKRVHHQVODYHGZLWKLQ WKH IRUW7KLV WKHRU\ LVPDGHPRUH OLNHO\E\ WKH OLVWLQJRI µFKDLQV IRUVODYHV¶
alongside the pot itself ± an item that was carried on all slaving ships engaging in the triangular trade, 
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but was nonetheless never registered in the document, not being taxed as a commodity. Here however, 
given the exception of its mention, it is likely that there were to be enslaved Africans traded 
specifically for the establishment of this plantation. Sugar production required a boiling process, with 
four separate occasions of raw sugar or sugar cane recorded being sent to the African settlements in 
DQGWZLFHLQµ%RLOLQJ:D[¶ZDVDOVRSUHVHQWZLWKWKHFDUJRHVDORQJZLWKVLJQLILFDQW
amounts of tallow, a commodity that served numerous contemporary purposes, but worked as a 
fundamental oil-substance in the refining of sugar.266 These were listed alongside the mills and copper 
pots for boiling, suggesting a strong link towards attempted production supported further by the 
almost entire absence of sugar from the rest of the Outgoings. Despite this, sugar was clearly very 
much a commodity that appealed to the sweet tooth of the European, and not the African ± failing to 
HYHQEHPHQWLRQHGLQ0DULRQ-RKQVRQ¶VODUJH-scale work on the commodities of the Anglo-African 
trade.267  
/LVWLQJV RI IXUWKHU PLOOV WKLV WLPH VSHFLILFDOO\ IRU FRUQ ZHUH VKLSSHG IRU WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
WHUULWRULHV LQ  DORQJ ZLWK LQVWUXPHQWV EHILWWLQJ LWV UDLVLQJ³%XQGOHV >RI@ 6SDGHV 	 SLWFKIRUNV´
garden seeds, hoes, wheelbarrows, wheat and barley and watering pots were collectively shipped, 
further suggesting attempted cultivation of crops in the factories. Indeed, many West African 
communities had begun their own cultivation of European-imported goods as the climate allowed for. 
Tobacco had been produced in Senegambia since the early seventeenth century, and continued to be 
done so until the late eighteenth.268 Alongside this, mustard seeds from the Mediterranean and North 
Africa were shipped on occasion, suggesting Company factors believed the climate in West Africa to 
EHVXIILFLHQWWRFXOWLYDWHWKLVFURSWKHPVHOYHVIRUH[SRUWDWLRQ2WKHUVKLSPHQWV¶EXONFRQWDLQHGIRRG
supplies and stock, with firm favourites supplied throughout the document being domestic staples 
such as beef, pork, butter, cheese, vinegar, cooking oil, flour, biscuits, beans and salt. Other present 
goods repeatedly shipped were staples of the East Indies trade, sometimes even commodities more 
commonly found in the Dutch East Indies, such as ginger, mace, pepper, cinnamon and other, unlisted 
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µVSLFHV¶%HHUµVWURQJEHHU¶µ$TXD9LWDH¶ ± brandy ± and spirits were sent in dozens of gallons for the 
Company factors to drink, and were contained on practically every ship sent to the African coast. 
Even assorted essentials for the day-to-day of the settlements were supplied numerous times a year, 
ZLWK WKH OLNHV RI FDQGOHV ZD[ MRXUQDOV ³5$& ORGJHV´ ³TXRLOV >RI@ URSHJUDSQHOOVFRPSDVVHV
quadrants...paper...ink...tobacco pipes...tobacco ...sives...lanterns [and] woodaxes..´  3LWFK DQG WDU
was increasingly sent over the period for the maintenance of not only Company ships, but now too 
any separate traders that were engaging in castle as well as ship trade.269 
 Permanent imperial settlement in Africa was the intention behind WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
establishment in the 1670s. Persistent attempts by the Company, encouraged by the government of the 
day, were made at cultivation with the likes of Petley Wyburne being appointed factor of the 
&RPSDQ\¶VIRUWDW:K\GDKZLWKWKHVROHSXUSRVe of growing and selling pepper on a mass scale. In 
1705, Dalby Thomas supplied indigo seeds to English settlements hoping to profit from their growth 
and sale, with the desire to spread plantations along the West African coast of other such commodities 
too.270 From the very way the forts were designed and constructed, it was clearly and increasingly 
evident that the intention of the Stuart monarchs in West Africa was similar to that of the Americas. 
Their developments post-1699 were illustrative both of how these objectives continued with the post-
1689 governments, and how the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was a catalyst for a process which 
had slowed given the sufferings the forts and factories had come under in the late war. With colonial 
settlement brought the need for supply, something which was extravagantly expensive, costing the 
Royal African Company £20-25,000 per year in ships alone.271 Attempts at cultivation and production 
at Cape Coast Castle and other such settlements began at the turn of the eighteenth century as an 
offset of these immense costs of supplying even the most basic foodstuffs, and accompanied years of 
ambition at attempting to establish plantations in West Africa through an ongoing, long-term imperial 
agenda. Just as the commencing of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa in 1698 accelerated this 
procedure, so did its expiry in 1712. Being utterly defeated commercially, coming to terms with its 
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identity as a colonial entity in West Africa became manifest through the efforts of James Brydges, 
duke of Chandos in constructing further forts in Angola during the reconstitution of the Company in 
the early 1720s.272 ,QIOXHQFHGJUHDWO\E\'DYHQDQW¶VZRUGVRILWEHLQJ³WKH8QGRXEWHG$GYDQWDJHRI
this Nation to plant, raise or Produce any Commodity..LQRWKHU&RXQWULHVIRURXU5HDG\0RQH\´WKH
hopes ± dashed by the end of the 1720s ± of establishing further plantations of indigo, pepper and 
cotton in Africa were high.273 Defoe gave irate callings in his celebrated Plan of Commerce that 
³*UHDWLPSURYHPHQWVLQWUDGHPXVWEHPDGHE\&RQTXHVW´IUXVWUDWHGWKDWWKHUH³>ZD@VQRWWKHOHDVW
8VH PDGH RI WKH /DQG´ ZKLOVW³WKH IUXLWIXO 6RLO OLHV ZDVWH´274 Reflecting upon a mood of colonial 
venture in Africa, others began to include West Africa in assessments of (QJODQG¶V DGPLQLVWHUHG
colonies.275 Indeed, with Chandos raising 15,696 new shares for the Company on this basis, it had 
undoubtedly transcended into a colonial venture.276 
 Although barely given space in scholarly work on British imperialism in the eighteenth 
FHQWXU\ &KDQGRV¶ H[SHGLWLRQ DWWHPSWV DUH QRW VXUSULVLQJ 'HVSLWH WKH PHUH IHZ KXQGUHG %ULWLVK
settlers and agents that existed on the West African coast, it was nevertheless at the forefront of 
British colonial concerns from the Restoration of Charles II in 1660. Where the charter of the Royal 
$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\VSHFLILFDOO\GHQRWHGLWVSULPDU\FRQFHUQVRYHU³ODQGVWHQHPHQWV´DQG³UHQWV´EHLQJ
settled in West Africa in 1672, this not only continued into the eighteenth century, but developed into 
desires for plantation establishment and an economy of production as well as commerce, akin to that 
of the North American colonies.277 Under the central authority of the Stuart monarchies, possession of 
the trade and possession of the coast grew to become one and the same under their central authority ± 
the trade was after all conducted by a single royally chartered company. This was made clear from the 
ILUVWGHFODUDWLRQRIWKH&RPSDQ\RI5R\DO$GYHQWXUHUVWKH5$&¶VSUHGHFHVVRULQWKHHDUO\V278 
The Act of 1698 was WKH FDWDO\VW ZKLFK VHYHUHG WKH OHJDO FRQQHFWLRQ MXVWLI\LQJ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
                                                          
272
 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW p.165. 
273
 Davenant; Reflections p.138. 
274
 Daniel Defoe; A Plan of the English Commerce (London, 1728)  this ed. Oxford, 1928 pp.246-7. 
275
 Wood; Survey p.193. 
276
 Pettigrew; )UHHGRP¶V'HEW p.167. 
277
 The Charter of the Royal African Company p.181. 
278
 Declaration of the Company of Royal Adventurers of England Trading to Africa,  January 12, 1663, in Donnan; 
Documents Vol 1 pp.157-8. 
100 
 
ownership of the trade and allowing for its opening to independent merchants, but reinforced the 
Company ownership of the forts, factories and settlements that had been in possession of the Crown 
since the mid-seventeenth century. With this, even many of the separate traders, as we have seen, 
recognised the role West African forts and Cape Coast Castle played in national security, and were 



























The imperial significance of the Act to Settle the Trade to Africa was its longest lasting. Providing the 
legislative assurance that the colonial role of the Royal African Company was its prime role, the act 
provided a forerunner for British policy in West Africa most commonly associated with the British 
Empire of the late nineteenth-century. Although by the mid-1720s the Royal African Company had 
seen its last days of real profitable trading, its basis as a central part of British colonial and imperial 
infrastructure was cemented in what was by most regards a hostile political environment. It was of 
course correct that the 1698 Act heralded a huge rise in the numbers of enslaved Africans being 
transported across the Atlantic. In many ways, it embodies the beginning of the British slave trade that 
existed on a mass-scale, rightly coming to be associated with eighteenth century commerce with an 
average of over 26,000 individual Africans shipped per year.279 By satiating the domestic demand to 
trade however, the 1698 Act in turn cemented the desire for a strong colonial presence in West Africa 
to be maintained. In many ways although the 1698 Act has come to be associated with everything the 
Stuart ideology was opposed to ± a more open trade, deregulation of colonial control, the spread of 
commercial interests outside of the London metropolitan ± the opposite was moreover true. 
Negotiating the compromise between the Royal African Company and the separate traders was not 
only to satisfy a broad base of calls to widen the access of trade. The state was foremost concerned 
with settling what it saw to be the most pressing issue regarding West Africa ± its colonial 
presence.280  
 Correspondingly, by settling the Anglo-African trading dispute with such a compromise, the 
1698 Act fostered the consequence of more, individual compromises between the agents of the RAC 
and separate traders. Although not rigid Company policy, legal constraints no longer prohibited agents 
from working alongside not only former company agents, but former interlopers which were not 
above defrauding the Company of thousands of pounds, as per Robert Heysham and others. 281 
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Whereby the likes of Davenant asserted that internal competition between separate trader and Royal 
$IULFDQ&RPSDQ\ZRXOGRQO\KDYHD³SHUQLFLRXVHIIHFW´RQeconomic prosperity of the Anglo-African 
trade, what is illustrated in the Company Outgoings and Incomings far more accurately represents a 
trade of collaboration.282 This cooperation between the Royal African Company and many separate 
traders illustrated in the Outgoings presented a hidden mechanism of Anglo-African trade which was 
to make it unique, and of its own kind when observing other such trades to the East Indies or across 
the Atlantic. 
 The Act to Settle the Trade to Africa also fundamentally highlighted the pressure regional as 
well as metropolitan political lobbies held at the turn of the eighteenth century. If only impacting 
redwood dyes, the lobbying of domestic textile interests in Britain illustrated significant economic 
links between England and West Africa heretofore not recognised as existing until the 1760s.283 These 
lobbies in turn had been formed in interests who were not only dependent on strong bilateral 
commercial relationships with West African markets, but influenced greatly by the growth of East 
Indian textiles appearing in Britain. Illustrating the global influences of English domestic politics, 
these subtle changes to legislature brought about through wide-spread domestic concern, of which the 
lowering of redwood duties in the 1698 Act was amongst the first ± were to become a growing part of 
eighteenth century British political decision making. Not alone in showing the fundamental 
connection between markets in the East and West Africa, the 2XWJRLQJV¶ plethora of goods and 
commodities that were being provided by the English merchants multiplied as a result of the 1698 
Act, impacting most significantly the Eastern textiles which had severe restrictions placed on their 
importation to Britain. Indeed, it is this very width and depth of the effects of the Act to Settle the 
Trade to Africa which signify its significance. Not just the trade in enslaved Africans, but the Anglo-
African relationship as a whole was fundamentally recognised by the 1698 Act, colonially and 
commercially, bridging not only East and West in the minds of governance in London, but the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the minds of historians.  
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Numerous processes were maintained in the work on the T70 documents, listed here. A dictionary of 
every single commodity mentioned in both tax books - 473 in total ± and cross referencing these with 
WKH OLNHV RI &KDXGKXUL¶V Trading World of Asia and The English East India Company 1660-1760 
 )HGRURZLF]¶ (QJODQG¶V %DOWLF 7UDGH LQ WKH (DUO\ 6HYHQWHHQWK &HQWXU\  5R\¶V
Traditional Industrial Economy of Colonial India (1999) and a host of works defining unique and 
WHFKQLFDOOLQHQVDQGFORWKVSUHGRPLQDQWO\&XPPLQJ&XQQLQJWRQ	&XQQLQJWRQ¶VThe Dictionary of 
Fashion History (1960).284 Furthermore, columns were inserted giving a checklist of those voyages 
which were commercial, colonial and those that suggested engagement in the slave trade using the 
goods contained. Shipments containing the likes of East Indian calicoes, Worsted woollen goods and 
bullion represented the majority of commercial voyages, whilst cargoes containing Garden seeds, 
ladders, culverins, flags, oars, boats and warehouses were clearly with the intention of maintaining 
forts and establishing factories. These, as mentioned, were not restricted to simply Company vessels 
as numerous independent merchants would ship on behalf of the RAC. Establishing those voyages 
likely engaging in the slave trade was achieved by cross referencing firstly any voyages of which a 
full journey is tracked from the Outgoings, departing with linens and bullion, and appearing some 
months later in the Incomings document with African goods. As this thesis focuses heavily on the use 
of data, works such as Mary Poovey; A History of the Modern Fact have been referred to in order to 
better grasp presenting such data. 
Worth noting too, is the documentation kept alongside the spreadsheets. Cataloguing the process of 
both assimilating the documents with present historical practice and the alterations and modifications 
has been crucial. Indeed, separate documentation was kept of the updates made to the data, whether 
placing the dates in line with the Gregorian calendar, the standardisation of spellings of ships, 
merchants and commodities (as there were, expectedly, many interesting variations) and further 
decisions taken in the construction of the spreadsheets. Accompanying these processes was the use of 
developed software with the aim of presenting the data in a clear and functional manner.  Plotting the 
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connections between merchants and commodities, and how frequently certain goods were traded with 
other goods, and by certain merchants was highly useful in understanding the extent of globalisation 
regarding British trade. Indeed, the most commonly associated goods with Worsted linens, for 
example, were cottons and other domestic products. This was the case, too, for East Indian and 
European commodities. However this does not undermine how frequently these goods were shipped 
together. Indeed, by far the most frequently shipped good to Africa in these documents was Iron, 
which was largely sourced from Northern Europe in the early eighteenth century. Iron too, shared 
cargoes evenly distributed between East Indian, Domestic, American and other European goods. 
Using Gephi software and the like illustrates most effectively this data. The world in a boat portrayed 
through the data time and again. The data is then stimulated once more by geo-plotting the origins of 
these goods on maps of the global trading theatres, of Europe, the Indian Subcontinent and the British 
Isles. Detailed illustrations highlighting not only the origin but the volume of these commodities 
present in the documents utilises the data in a highly presentable fashion. 
When assessing the number of voyages, estimations have to be made regarding how long ships 
remained in port. Certainly it is the case that many ships docked, unloaded over the space of a matter 
of days and were not again noted for some years, or, as in numerous cases, at all. However there are 
numerous instances, particularly noted in the Incomings of ships remaining docked for months at a 
time. This is judged chiefly by the destination of the ship being noted, as well as the Captain. 
Numerous vessels are traceable in the Slavevoyages database suggest as such, highlighting that the 
last entry of cargo loading is not necessarily the day of departure. Some are, for example the Betty 
Frigate both loading cargo for the final time and departing respectively on 27-02-1703. In many cases 
months at a time passed before the ship was to set sail. In other cases the date of cargo loading is 
subsequent to that of the recorded date of departure in the database. An example of this is Happy 
Return, purported to depart on 06-03-1702, with cargo loads noted in the T 70/1199 document 






List of the 46 Independent traders whom collaborated with the RAC 
Alexander Cleeve     Lewis Johnson 
Anthony Journey     Moses Francia 
Daniel Thomas      John Boston  
William Benson     Thomas Hudson 
Abraham Lodge     William Frost 
Richard Bartholomew     William Grosvener 
Samuel Ball      Peregrine Browne 
James Wayte      James Berdoe 
John Bertles      Maxwell Valesin 
Roger Gathorne      Robert Brook 
Nicholas Bartholomew     William Gibson 
John Maxwell      Matthew Johnson 
James Besouth      George Hammond 
Thomas Evano      Nathaniel Johnson               
John Grey      Richard Bond 
Nicholas Batch      Edward Parber 
Daniel Marm      Gerard Gore 
Thomas Ogden      Nicholas Batchelor 
Peter Joye      John Brace 
Anthony Manor      William Singleton 
John Ferguson      Ebeneezer Wyse 
Joseph Moore      William Grosdonor 




















































Box Seals & Weights 
Brass 
Brassierware 
Brawles* (See bottom of spreadsheet) 
Bread 
Breeches 
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